

INDIVIDUAL GIVING AND PHILANTHROPY IN TÜRKİYE 2024

PROF. DR. ALİ ÇARKOĞLU KOÇ UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CIVIL
SOCIETY AND PHILANTHROPY RESEARCH

ASSOC. PROF. DR. GÜNEŞ ERTAN KOÇ UNIVERSITY /
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ABOUT US

The Third Sector Foundation of Türkiye (TÜSEV) was established in 1993 with the aim of enhancing the legal, financial, and operational infrastructure of civil society. TÜSEV continues its work with the support of its Board of Trustees to create a more enabling environment for civil society to operate in and provide solutions to common challenges. TÜSEV is dedicated to fostering a stronger, participatory, and reputable civil society in Türkiye by pursuing the following objectives:

- Creating an enabling and supportive legal and financial environment for CSOs,
 - Promoting strategic and effective giving practices,
 - Ensuring dialogue and cooperation between the public sector, private sector, and civil society,
 - Promoting Turkish civil society internationally and establishing cooperation,
 - Enhancing the reputation of civil society,
 - Conducting research on civil society and increasing knowledge.
-

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABPRS	Address-Based Population Registration System
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AKUT	Search and Rescue Association
CAF	Charities Aid Foundation
ÇEK	Child Protection Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ÇYDD	Association for Supporting Contemporary Life
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNAT	Grand National Assembly of Türkiye
IHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
LÖSEV	Foundation for Children with Leukemia
NO/NR	No Opinion / No Response
NUTS-2	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics Level 2
THK	Turkish Aeronautical Association
TEGV	Education Volunteers Foundation of Türkiye
TEMA	Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats
TEV	Turkish Education Foundation
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institute
TÜRGEV	Youth and Education Service Foundation of Türkiye
TÜSEV	Third Sector Foundation of Türkiye

FOREWORD

Undoubtedly one of TÜSEV's flagship initiatives, the "Individual Giving and Philanthropy in Türkiye" report reflects over thirty years of the organization's commitment to building a stronger, more reputable, and participatory civil society. We are genuinely delighted to share with you the fifth edition of this report, the first of which was published in 2006 under the title Philanthropy in Türkiye: Citizens, Foundations and the Pursuit of Social Justice. Given that the fieldwork for the first report took place in 2004, the 2024 edition presents a valuable opportunity to collectively reflect on the key progress—and perhaps some setbacks—in Türkiye's civil society over the past two decades.

Prepared with scientific expertise and objectivity, and conducted with the same level of diligence, these studies offer us a unique opportunity for understanding and progress: What do our citizens expect from civil society? With what motivation, through which methods, and to whom do they donate? What is the relationship between "reputation" and "transparency"? How can we encourage individuals to increase their donations to organizations?

This report serves as an invaluable source of information not only for organizations that rely on individual donor support to sustain their activities, but also for anyone involved in voluntary, professional, or academic work in the field. I extend my sincere thanks to everyone who contributed to the preparation of this report, particularly Prof. Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu from Koç University Center for Civil Society and Philanthropy Research (KÜSİTHAM) and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Güneş Ertan from Koç University, as well as the TÜSEV team.

The Ekol Foundation funded the report; I owe special thanks to Ahmet Musul, Chair of the Foundation's Board of Directors, not only for this crucial support but also for his unwavering belief in civil society.

It is my sincere hope that the Individual Giving and Philanthropy in Türkiye Report will further strengthen and advance efforts in the civil society sector.

Erdal Yıldırım

TÜSEV, Chair of the Executive Board
(June 2021 – April 2025)

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study is a continuation of the Individual Giving and Philanthropy in Türkiye research series, conducted in 2004, 2015, 2019, and 2021, with the initiative and support of TÜSEV. It offers an in-depth examination of philanthropy in Türkiye, perspectives on civil society, and individual giving behavior—an effort we have sustained since 2004.¹ We want to emphasize the significance of these studies—carried out with a sample representative of Türkiye’s social structure—in terms of strengthening social solidarity and civil society. Philanthropy and giving behaviors not only reinforce social bonds among individuals but also enhance the sense of solidarity within society. In a country like Türkiye, where ethnic, religious, and class differences intersect with distinctions of gender and generation, understanding the drivers of solidarity is crucial for achieving social cohesion.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES AND PHILANTHROPY

Economic inequality is a significant issue in Türkiye. It is also clear that public resources fall short in addressing these inequalities. Philanthropy and individual giving play a crucial role in reducing economic disparities and supporting disadvantaged groups. Individual giving can help bridge the income distribution gap. Such donations made by individuals may be directed either directly to those in need or channeled through civil society organizations. Such transfers help alleviate economic inequality. Individuals and groups facing economic hardship often struggle to meet basic needs, including education, healthcare, and housing. Volunteering, philanthropic initiatives, and charitable donations can provide direct support to these groups, helping them meet their basic needs and strengthen their economic well-being.

¹ The 2004, 2015, 2019, and 2021 editions of the Individual Giving and Philanthropy in Türkiye reports are available in the e-Library section of TÜSEV’s website: <https://tusev.org.tr/e-kutuphane/>

In Türkiye, individual giving, particularly when directed toward scholarships, microfinance projects, or entrepreneurship support, can

enhance individuals' economic mobility. Donations such as scholarships enable individuals from lower-income backgrounds to access education and thereby enhance their prospects in the labor market. This increases their chances of improving their socioeconomic status and helps prevent the intergenerational transmission of economic inequality.

Directing individual giving toward local projects can help revitalize local economies in economically disadvantaged regions. Support for small-scale enterprises or assistance directed toward infrastructure projects can promote regional development and help reduce regional economic disparities. In times when economic inequalities deepen, it may become increasingly difficult for the state alone to secure the resources needed to reduce poverty or meet all needs.

Philanthropy, as a complementary element supporting the state's social welfare policies, enables the distribution of economic burden across other members of society. This helps reduce the pressure on the social security system and allows for broader segments of the population to be supported.

The widespread practice of philanthropy and giving also raises awareness of economic inequalities within society. As a result, individuals begin to consider how they can support those experiencing financial hardship, and a sense of social justice emerges. Such awareness can generate public pressure for the adoption of more sustainable and inclusive economic policies.

The findings of these studies are essential both for understanding individuals' motivations for giving and for developing strategies to strengthen social solidarity by encouraging such behavior. Philanthropy may enable a more equitable distribution of resources and, in this respect, can be considered an effective tool for mitigating economic inequalities.

From this perspective, identifying the extent to which civil society organizations (CSOs) in Türkiye receive support from philanthropic

giving helps to understand the role they play in addressing economic inequalities. An analysis of giving behaviors also provides strategic insights for increasing the effectiveness of CSOs and raising broader public awareness.

The significance of studies on philanthropy and individual giving can be addressed not only in terms of economic inequality but also from social, psychological, cultural, and political perspectives. Philanthropic engagement is expected to increase individuals' sensitivity toward other segments of society. Such behavior strengthens social bonds, fosters a culture of solidarity, and enhances mutual trust among different groups within society. This also plays a significant role in fostering social cohesion and reducing societal conflicts.

DEMOCRACY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Philanthropy and individual giving are vital sources of support for civil society organizations, enabling them to sustain their activities. These organizations play a key role in democratic societies by promoting individuals' participation in politics, defending individual rights, and raising public awareness. Strengthened through donations, CSOs enable the representation of diverse segments of society and foster more active participation in democratic processes.

Philanthropic activities enhance individuals' awareness of social issues. Donations contribute to the social and cultural development of both individuals and society, helping foster a more conscious, engaged, and empathetic generation. International aid and philanthropy also positively influence a country's image on the global stage. In countries like Türkiye, international aid and philanthropic initiatives can help strengthen relations with other nations and contribute to cultivating a positive global image.

INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND PHILANTHROPY

Philanthropic behavior also has positive psychological effects on individuals. Research shows that individuals who make donations tend to feel happier, more fulfilled, and more connected to a meaningful purpose in life. Philanthropy not only fosters a sense of responsibility toward society but also offers a psychologically rewarding experience.

Philanthropic efforts also contribute to the preservation of a society's ethical values and cultural heritage. In many cultures, philanthropy and solidarity are among the core ethical values. Individual giving fosters the preservation of these cultural values and helps transmit them to broader segments of society. Individual giving and philanthropy set an example for future generations. Children and youth learn the importance of contributing to society by witnessing acts of philanthropy, thus ensuring the long-term sustainability of a culture of solidarity.

Philanthropy is especially important in supporting creative social initiatives. Individual giving can help bring to life innovative projects that may not have easy access to traditional funding sources. Donations to projects that develop creative solutions in areas such as education, the environment, and health enable new approaches to addressing social problems. For policymakers in Türkiye, understanding trends in individual giving can help identify new sources of funding for social initiatives in areas like poverty alleviation, health, and education. We hope this study not only enhances our understanding of the current giving landscape but also offers meaningful insights into how such behaviors can be encouraged and how sustainable sources of support for social projects can be cultivated.

PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE FACE OF NATURAL DISASTERS

In countries like Türkiye, where natural disasters occur frequently, individual giving and philanthropy play a crucial role in post-disaster relief and recovery efforts. Such support can be deployed rapidly and effectively, especially when public resources are limited or urgent response is required. The widespread devastation caused by the 2023 earthquakes in Kahramanmaraş and Hatay is a clear example. In the immediate aftermath, CSOs and individual philanthropists mobilized both through volunteer efforts and financial contributions to ensure that aid reached the affected areas swiftly. Later in this report, we share insights from interviews conducted across Türkiye approximately 18 months after the earthquakes, where participants were asked about their experiences following the disaster and their perspectives on philanthropy and giving behavior. The responses offer valuable insights into how civil society and philanthropic actors can be more effectively mobilized during times of crisis.

RELIGIOUS VALUES AND PHILANTHROPY

From an alternative perspective, findings on giving and civil society activity are also valuable in understanding how public-benefit donations and initiatives, driven by either religious (spiritual) or secular (worldly) motivations, contribute to social cohesion and development across different countries. In Türkiye, philanthropy is closely tied to cultural and religious values, with individuals' motivations for giving being powerfully shaped by religion and culture. Therefore, studies on philanthropy help us better understand this aspect of society and examine the reasons behind giving in greater depth, shedding light on the motivations of different groups.

Philanthropy and charitable giving in Türkiye are rooted in longstanding cultural traditions. Concepts such as sadaqah, zakat, and

fitrah, which are integral to Islamic culture, have contributed to the widespread practice of charitable acts in society. As evidenced by our earlier research, it is not always possible to distinguish between donations and philanthropic behavior motivated by religious beliefs and those motivated by other factors. A donation may well be driven by religious intent, or it may occur entirely independently of such motivations. While it is difficult to draw a strict line between religious (spiritual) and secular (worldly) motivations, in the following sections, we track donations such as zakat and fitrah over time to observe the trends of donations that are clearly of a religious nature. It should also be acknowledged that other donations, volunteering, and related activities may be influenced by religious and cultural elements as well.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Conducted since 2004 with the initiative and support of TÜSEV, this study on philanthropy and individual giving sheds light on the transformation Türkiye's social fabric has undergone over the past two decades. A review of key demographic indicators from the sample shows that the average age has increased from 39 to 43; the proportion of those with primary or lower levels of education has decreased from 60% to 24%; while those with a university degree or higher have risen from 8% to 22%. In 2004, 73% of respondents were married; this declined to 66% in 2024. As a result, the average household size has also decreased from 4.3 in 2004 to 3.5 in 2024.

This suggests a population that is aging, more educated, living in smaller households, and becoming increasingly urban. Urban residents constituted 65% of respondents in the initial 2004 survey; by 2024, this proportion had increased to 93%. This definition of urban also includes rural populations living in cities. It remains challenging to define *gecekondu* households (informal settlements), and zoning status is not a sufficient criterion for classification. Nevertheless, based on the subjective judgment of the fieldwork interviewers, 9% of the 2024 surveys were conducted in *gecekondu* households.

In this study, we also attempted to measure both income and asset ownership. When measuring asset ownership as the percentage of listed items owned by respondents where the number of items on the list has gradually increased in each survey, the average asset ownership index was 48.3% in 2004. In 2024, the sample owned, on average, 55.9% of a more extensive list of assets. Reported per capita household income has increased 3.5-fold since 2004, in part due to a decrease in household size. However, subjective assessments of economic wellbeing have worsened since 2004, and the proportion of respondents who report being satisfied with life is at its lowest recorded level in 2024.

Trust in organizations closely associated with philanthropy and individual giving has gradually declined over the past twenty years. Although 2024 does not mark the lowest point, it stands as the second-lowest year in terms of institutional trust. People who do not trust organizations are understandably less inclined to donate through them. Still, trust is not the sole factor shaping individuals' giving behavior.

One would also expect a general worldview or ideology to influence philanthropic and giving behavior. Over the past twenty years in Türkiye, voters on the center-right have consistently constituted the dominant group. In recent years, however, voters on the center-left have surpassed those at the ideological center to become the second most prominent group after the center-right. The weakening of the center and the rise of both left and right suggest a growing ideological polarization in the country. The dominant majority, aligned with the prevailing right-wing ideology, identifies as religious. However, even within this group, there has been a relative decline in religious practices over the past nine years, if not the last twenty.

The proportion of individuals who report giving fitrah or zakat, or performing qurbani donations as part of religious observance, has declined. However, a smaller group of individuals has been making increasingly larger contributions, leading to a rise in the average per capita amount donated. Adjusted for 2024 prices, the real value of fitrah payments has

increased by approximately 49% compared to 2004, and zakat payments have grown by a factor of 2.7. Despite this notable increase, these donations are still predominantly made directly to individuals, mostly to relatives, friends, and close contacts, rather than through organizations.

The proportion of individuals reporting that they provide direct aid to relatives, neighbors, and other people in need has risen from 44% in 2004 to 49% in 2024. While the overall share of in-kind aid —such as food, clothing, and fuel— as well as cash aid to relatives, neighbors, and other people in need has decreased, the real value of these forms of aid appears to have increased. The most significant increase is observed in the amount of aid directed toward those in need outside one's immediate circle of relatives and neighbors.

The proportion of donations made through organizations has increased from 18% in 2004 to 35% in 2024. The average per capita donation amount has also increased in real terms by a factor of 7.6. The rate of volunteering in CSOs has risen from 6% to 13% between 2004 and 2024, while participation in meetings has grown from 4% to 9%, and membership from 7% to 11%.

In terms of membership, the most notable growth is seen among generic types of organizations such as those working in the fields of environment and natural disasters, as well as professional chambers, trade unions, and general philanthropic organizations. However, the membership rate does not exceed 2.5% for any of these organizations. In contrast, a decline is observed in membership rates for political parties and sports clubs.

The most notable increase in volunteering rates is observed at the Turkish Red Crescent. While in 2004 the volunteering rate for Turkish Red Crescent was approximately 1%, this figure has risen to 33% in the 2024 sample. The volunteering rate stands at 2.8% for organizations working to assist those affected by natural disasters, while it is approximately

1.7% for professional chambers, environmental and animal rights organizations, sports clubs, and philanthropic organizations. While overall participation in meetings remains low, there appears to be a notable increase in participation rates for sports clubs, religious associations, and professional chambers.

The most striking changes are observed in donation rates across various generic and specific organizations. While almost no respondents reported donating to the Turkish Red Crescent in 2004; by 2024, 11.6% of the sample reported having donated to the organization. A similar increase is observed among other organizations as well, rising from near-zero levels in earlier years to 7.8% for philanthropic organizations, 6.6% for LÖSEV, 6% for organizations supporting those affected by natural disasters, and 5.7% for the Ahbap Association in 2024. Organizations working in the fields of environmental and animal rights, as well as İHH, have also reached approximately 4.3%, up from previously negligible levels.

An evaluation of giving and volunteering behavior following the 2023 Kahramanmaraş Earthquakes demonstrated that 25% of citizens preferred to make their donations through civil society organizations. This rate exceeds that of both direct giving and those made through public institutions. As was the case after the Marmara Earthquake in 1999, this trend may be seen as a critical turning point in terms of the increased effectiveness and credibility of civil society.

While approximately 65% of the public engaged in giving and volunteering activities following the earthquake, only 13% have continued these efforts regularly. Nevertheless, the sustained engagement of this small group represents a significant step forward in developing a culture of philanthropy in Türkiye. The findings also highlight the need to take informal networks into account in post-disaster mobilization efforts.

2. THE SAMPLE


This study was conducted based on interviews with a sample representative of the voting-age population in Türkiye. The fieldwork was conducted between July 20 and August 25, 2024, by Birim Research under the coordination of the *Infakto Research Group*. A total of 1,408 face-to-face interviews were conducted with individuals residing in households across 99 districts in 50 provinces of Türkiye. No payments or gifts were offered to the interviewees. Figure 2.1 shows the provinces included in the sample.

The sampling design followed the same framework used in previous studies. First, the target number of 1,400 interviews was distributed across Türkiye's 26 NUTS-2 (The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, Level 2) regions according to the rural-urban population ratio. Based on the resulting target number of interviews per stratum, the number of clusters needed to reach 20 households in each was calculated. Then, from the Turkish Statistical Institute's (TÜİK) Address-Based Population Registration System (ABPRS), 20 random

FIGURE 2.1

Distribution of the sample by province

◆ Provinces included in the sample



addresses were selected from each cluster composed of 100 household addresses. Upon reaching each selected address, a list of residents aged 18 and over was compiled, and one individual was randomly selected for an interview based on their date of birth. If the selected individual were not available or the interview could not be conducted for other reasons, up to three additional visits were made to the same address. If no interview could be completed after these three attempts, the address was excluded from the sample. Based on prior experience, approximately 50% of selected addresses were expected to be excluded in this manner. Therefore, the initial target sample size was set at twice the number of planned interviews.

The key demographic characteristics of the resulting sample are presented in Figure 2.2, in comparison with those of previous studies. The gender distribution was approximately 50% female and 50% male, resulting from random selection. The average age of the sample has steadily increased since the first study in 2004, when the average age was 39. Reflecting the trend of an aging population over the past twenty years, the average age in the most recent 2024 study has reached 43. The average household size of the respondents has also declined over the past two decades, in parallel with the increase in both the average age and educational level. In parallel with the decline in household size, the proportion of single individuals in the sample has increased, while the proportion of married individuals has decreased. Compared to 2004, the proportion of married individuals has decreased by nearly 7 percentage points. While the proportion of single individuals has increased by nearly 5 percentage points, the proportion of divorced and widowed individuals has also increased. Although it is difficult to generalize about individuals' life stages, typically, the giving phase does not coincide with the period before individuals start a family. In this regard, although the rise in the proportion of single individuals may not support overall giving behavior, it may foster greater participation in civil society activities and volunteering, given their relatively fewer time constraints.

The educational level of those included in the sample has also increased significantly over the past twenty years. The proportion of university graduates, which was 8% in 2004, increased to 22% by 2024. In 2004, the proportion of individuals with primary school education or less was 60%, whereas by 2024, it had declined to approximately 24%. Considering that this figure also includes around 6% who are literate without a diploma or who never attended school and are illiterate, it emerges that nearly one in four individuals have not completed basic education or is not literate. Although this rate has declined, it is important to emphasize that the education level of those shaping the basic indicators derived from the sample is still quite low. While there has been an increase since 2004, the level of general education remains low. It is also worth emphasizing that the proportion of individuals with low educational attainment remains significantly higher compared to that of any European country.


Since 2004, respondents have been asked which languages they are still able to speak, such as German, French, English, Arabic, Kurdish, and Zaza. In addition, an open-ended question was posed: "Which language or languages did you use when speaking with parents in your daily conversations during your childhood?". Respondents who answered either question with *Kurdish* or *Zaza* were categorized as Kurdish speakers. Based on this approach, the share of Kurdish-speaking respondents ranges between 13% and 15%, as shown in Figure 2.2. The differing responses of this group—who can be considered of Kurdish origin—to various questions will be noted in our subsequent analyses.

Similarly, we sought to identify Alevi citizens. In 2004, this identification was made with a single question, which does not allow for comparison across subsequent years.² Nevertheless, we have included the group identified by this question in Figure 2.2. In later studies, we employed a

2 This reflects the share of respondents who identified as Alevi in response to the question "Which Islamic denomination do you belong to?".

FIGURE 2.2

Key characteristics
of the samples,
2004-2024 (%)



three-question method, as detailed in Çarkoğlu (2005), to identify Alevi respondents.³ These questions were posed not only to those who did not identify as Sunni Muslims and responded directly to the question “Do you identify as Alevi?”, but also included whether figures such as Ali, Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli, and Sheikh Ahmet Yesevi held significance in their belief system, and whether images of the Twelve Imams or of Ali were present in their homes.

If the response to any of these three questions aligned with what we would expect from an Alevi respondent, the individual was classified as Alevi. Since adopting this method, the share of respondents identified as Alevi has increased from approximately 16% to 23% over time. This method cannot identify Alevi individuals with absolute accuracy.

However, it enables us to designate as Alevi those who, beyond giving affirmative responses to direct questions, also display behavioral patterns in line with expectations, allowing for a more robust identification. We will draw attention to these observed patterns in the subsequent analytical sections.

We will use the sample’s key demographic indicators as control variables in our analysis of giving behavior. Do men and women differ in their attitudes and giving behaviors? As educational attainment increases, do we observe the expected rise in positive perceptions of giving and civil society? The effects of household size and differences between married and single individuals will be key variables examined in each of our in-depth analyses.

INCOME AND ASSET OWNERSHIP

One of the most significant factors influencing individuals’ philanthropic and giving behavior is their income. In the first study conducted

in 2004, we used the following question as a flow measure: “Considering the past six months, and taking into account all income earned by household members (e.g., salaries, rent, pensions, etc.), which of the following income groups would your average total monthly household income be closest to?” Starting in 2015, the following open-ended question was asked: “Considering the past six months and taking into account all income earned by household members (e.g., salaries, rent, pensions, etc.), what is your average total monthly household income?”. Those who did not respond to this question were then asked the earlier closed-ended version. This two-step approach aimed at increasing the response rate. Naturally, the income brackets provided in the closed-ended questions changed over time: while the 2004 categories ranged from “less than 150 million” to “more than 5 billion,” twenty years later, the brackets ranged from “10,000 TL or below” to “80,000 TL or above.” These measurements are not entirely satisfactory or accurate when considered in the context of Türkiye’s social realities.


By posing two separate questions, we implicitly acknowledge that respondents may be reluctant to disclose their income to an interviewer visiting their household. The answers provided may deviate from the truth for several reasons. For individuals who do not earn a regular salary as civil servants or private sector employees, estimating their income is naturally more difficult. When we also take into account seasonal fluctuations in earnings — whether formal or informal — it becomes evident that accurately calculating income is genuinely challenging for this group. For this reason, we treat these measurements as approximate estimations.

To make changes over time more comparable, the reported figures have been adjusted to 2024 prices (Figure 2.3). Current prices do not allow for meaningful comparisons due to inflation. In addition, total household income has been calculated on a per capita basis, which slightly increases the per capita household income as a result of the decrease in average household size.

3 See Çarkoğlu, A. (2005). Political preferences of the Turkish electorate: reflections of an Alevi-Sunni cleavage. *Turkish Studies*, 6(2), 273-292.

FIGURE 2.3

Mean per capita household income, 2024 prices



Despite all the measurement limitations mentioned, per capita household income has shown a meaningful increase over the past twenty years (Figure 2.3). In the years following 2004, per capita income rose by 24% as of 2015 by 80% as of 2021. By 2024, it had reached 3.5 times the 2004 level.

In addition to income, we also sought to assess total household assets. Clearly, in households with low asset levels, the tendency to give is expected to be low, as expenditures are more likely to be directed toward increasing asset ownership. In the 2004 study, asset ownership was measured through items such as home and car ownership, as well as ownership of landline and mobile phones, dishwashers, automatic washing machines, computers, and credit cards.

By 2015, the number of asset items increased to 14, later reduced to 13 with the removal of landline phone ownership from the list. In this updated list, in addition to home and car ownership, we also included items such as vacation homes, rental property, and savings accounts in banks. With the inclusion of internet access, computers, washing machines, dishwashers, credit cards, and mobile phones, the aim was to assess individuals' and households' asset levels across a broad spectrum. To eliminate the effect of changing item counts over time, all ownership responses were converted into an index ranging from 0 to 100. Accordingly, the share of the total listed items owned by each respondent was calculated.

FIGURE 2.4

Asset ownership
index scores, 2004–
2024



Figure 2.4 illustrates a steady increase in asset ownership over time. In 2004, 66% of respondents had a score of 50 or below on the 0-100 index, whereas this proportion declined to 58% in 2015, 49% in 2019, 41% in 2021, and 32% in 2024. In 2024, only 5% of respondents owned 90% or more of the listed items. This allows for an examination of the relationship between reported giving behavior and the two primary determinants: income and assets.

3. FACTORS AFFECTING PHILANTHROPY AND GIVING BEHAVIOUR

This section focuses on the distribution of several other variables in the sample that are expected to facilitate our understanding of philanthropic and giving behavior.

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

Trust in institutions has a direct impact on a society's stability, prosperity, and democratic functioning. It helps individuals unite around shared values. A lack of trust, on the other hand, may lead to social conflict, polarization, and alienation. For instance, when confidence in the judiciary diminishes, people may attempt

to resolve issues on their own, which can potentially lead to chaos.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) also serve as oversight mechanisms for both the government and the private sector. Trustworthy CSOs play a critical role in combating corruption and promoting transparency and accountability. When the public lacks trust in these organizations, oversight mechanisms weaken, leading to challenges in governance. Trusted institutions also encourage investors and entrepreneurs to take risks. A fair judicial system, transparent public administration, and reliable financial regulations are all pillars of

economic growth. Conversely, mistrust may lead to corruption, resource mismanagement, and economic crises, while undermining the effective implementation of policies and reducing citizens' willingness to comply with the law. Countries with trustworthy institutions are likely to enjoy a more reputable and influential position in the international arena. In countries where public trust is high, they are better positioned to attract foreign investment, strengthen diplomatic relations, and protect their strategic interests.

Democracy requires individuals to participate in the system through elections, protests, and other means. When people do not trust state institutions, voter turnout declines, a crisis of representation emerges, and the legitimacy of democracy is called into question. The quality of public services is closely tied to the level of trust in the institutions that provide them. Effectiveness and efficiency in areas such as health, education, and security increase with institutional integrity and competence. Mistrust, on the other hand, lowers the demand for and engagement with these services. In times of crisis such as natural disasters, economic downturns, or public health emergencies, reliable institutions can offer swift and effective solutions. In the absence of trust, however, the spread of misinformation, public panic, and lack of coordination may exacerbate the crisis.

When discussing trust in institutions, it is essential to highlight the role of CSOs. Trust in CSOs plays a critical role in ensuring that democratic societies function effectively and remain resilient. CSOs bring together different segments of society to develop collective solutions. Trusted CSOs can serve as unifying actors and help reduce polarization. In the absence of trust, this role weakens, and social tensions may intensify.

CSOs are crucial in identifying societal needs, addressing social problems, and contributing to public governance. They often work on behalf of disadvantaged groups, minorities, and communities whose voices are otherwise unheard. Trust in these organizations enables

them to represent such groups accurately and effectively. Where trust is lacking, defending the rights of these groups becomes more difficult.

CSOs also promote civic participation in public policy and social problems. People are more inclined to address problems and contribute to social transformation through organizations they trust. A lack of trust, by contrast, diminishes civic engagement and slows down social change. In areas such as education, health, the environment, and human rights, CSOs provide essential services where governments may fall short. Trust in CSOs translates into increased donations, volunteering, and cooperation. Mistrust, however, makes it more difficult for CSOs to mobilize resources and operate effectively.


CSOs can provide rapid and effective responses during natural disasters, pandemics, or humanitarian crises. When the public places trust in these organizations, relief efforts can be conducted in a more organized and efficient manner. Conversely, a lack of trust may lead to coordination problems in crisis management.

Enhancing trust in institutions requires transparency, accountability, merit-based systems, participatory governance, and the establishment of a just system. Without trust, it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure a sustainable future for both individuals and society as a whole. In various sections of this study, we present findings on measures to enhance trust and improve the effectiveness of CSOs.

Since the first edition of our study, we have measured the extent to which individuals trust different institutions. We would expect to find a relationship between trust in institutions and both attitudes toward civil society and giving behavior. Individuals who do not trust institutions are also less likely to make donations through them. To measure trust, we used a scale ranging from "do not trust at all" (1) to "completely trust" (10). Since 2004, the same question has been posed in relation to 26 different institutions. Not every institution has

FIGURE 3.1a

Trust in institutions – central government and other organizations



been included in every edition; in some cases, different institutions were assessed. Below is an overview of how trust in various civil society organizations, central government bodies, and their affiliated institutions, as well as other institutional categories, has changed over the past twenty years. The most striking overall finding here is the considerable variation in trust scores, both over time and across different institutions. Although this variation is not explored in detail here, it is worth noting that a deeper understanding would necessitate a more comprehensive study.

Looking at general levels of institutional trust in society, the average level of trust observed in 2024 is noticeably lower than in 2004. Within the central government, the Armed Forces maintain a relatively higher level of trust compared to other institutions. However, trust in this institution appears to have declined since 2004. Trust in Türkiye in the Türkiye Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and the police, as security-related institutions, is also higher on average compared to other institutions. As of 2024, the “central


government”—with its more overtly political identity and its association with the incumbent administration—elicits lower average trust than the Armed Forces, the police, and even the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (GNAT), which represents a broader political spectrum (Figure 3.1a).

Naturally, levels of trust in these institutions differ across partisan groups.⁴ In particular, political parties, which directly reflect partisan affiliations, consistently score the lowest average trust levels of all organizations included in each wave of the study. Among the institutions surveyed in 2004, no single institution registered an increase in average trust levels by 2024. The temporary increases observed for Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent) and GNAT in 2015 and 2019 have reversed by 2024.

⁴ See Çarkoğlu, A. 2022. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’ne Kamuoyunun Güveni”, Oder, B.E. and Üzeltürk, S. (eds.) TBMM Yüzüncü Yıl Armağanı, 33-54.

FIGURE 3.1b

Trust in institutions
– CSOs




The evolution of trust in the thirteen CSOs surveyed over the past twenty years is presented in Figure 3.1b. Overall, CSOs received an average trust score of 6.2 out of 10 in 2015 and 6.7 in 2019, which dropped to 4.9 in 2021, and recovered only slightly to 6.1 in 2024. As of 2024, organizations such as Ahbap Association, LÖSEV, TEMA, and TEV rank above the overall average trust level for CSOs, while İHH and TÜRGEV fall below it. The general trend, however, indicates that the average levels observed in 2024 are lower than those recorded in 2015 and 2019.

The average trust scores presented in these two figures have been grouped by year across the following categories: CSOs; central government and security institutions, armed forces, police, AFAD, GNAT, political parties, and municipalities, newspapers and private television channels, and other institutions (Turkish Red Crescent, muftis, CPA and TAA) (Figure 3.2). As shown here, by 2024, CSOs exhibit the highest average trust level compared to all other types of organizations. In previous years, particularly in 2004 and 2021,

the average trust in CSOs was significantly lower; however, by 2024, it appears to have reached a considerably better standing. At this stage, no concrete data is available to explain this development. One possible explanation, however, is the effective role played by CSOs in disaster response, which may have contributed to the observed increase in trust. Another contributing factor may be the decline in average trust levels for other institutions. For instance, while central government and security institutions scored higher in 2021, their averages remain below those recorded between 2004 and 2019. It is also important to note that the difference in average trust scores between CSOs and central government and security institutions is not statistically significant.

FIGURE 3.2

**Mean levels of trust
in institutions,
2004-2024**



We will examine in subsequent sections whether our expectation holds that greater institutional trust correlates with increased philanthropic and giving behavior. As previously noted, levels of trust in institutions vary significantly across both years and institutions. A significant reason for this variation lies in the substantial differences observed in both objective economic indicators and individuals' subjective assessments of their economic well-being in the years when the surveys were conducted. We now turn to how these subjective economic assessments have changed over time in the background of the study.

SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

In addition to being shaped by income and assets, philanthropic and giving behavior is also influenced by subjective assessments of economic well-being. Individuals tend to form a sense of satisfaction about their situation and that of the country, which may differ significantly from their actual income or wealth level. Regardless of how high one's income or assets may be, one might still hold negative views about the country's overall state and the impact of government policies on their life. Conversely, even individuals with relatively low income and wealth may express a positive assessment of the country's condition and the effects of current policies.

It is to be expected that individuals' perception of their own economic well-being would influence their philanthropic and giving behavior. At the core of this expectation lies the idea that perceptions of economic well-

being shape both the motivation to give and the perceived availability of resources. When individuals feel they are in a good financial position, they may perceive themselves as having surplus resources and thus become more inclined to engage in philanthropy and giving. This is also naturally tied to the notion of helping others as a form of social responsibility. By contrast, individuals who feel economically constrained are more likely to prioritize their own needs, which can lead to a decline in philanthropic behavior. This negative perception reinforces the belief in limited resources.

That said, individuals experiencing economic hardship may also feel greater empathy toward others in similar situations. This may lead them to contribute through non-monetary means, such as volunteering or offering other forms of support. In fact, studies showing that individuals with lower income levels often give at a higher relative rate suggest the existence of such a solidarity reflex. In other words, there does not have to be a strictly linear relationship between giving and income or wealth.

Individuals who perceive their economic situation as poor may develop a tendency to avoid risk due to a heightened sense of uncertainty and may seek to increase their savings. This, in turn, can lead to a reduction in donation levels. Conversely, individuals who feel financially secure may adopt a more optimistic outlook toward the future, which can increase the likelihood of engaging in philanthropic behavior.

As economic outlooks and expectations improve, individuals who feel financially empowered may be more inclined to enhance their social status and image through giving. This behavior is linked to the desire to define or enhance one's place in society and is shaped by how fluid or rigid social status is perceived to be within that society.

Those who perceive their economic well-being negatively may experience a psychological need to create meaning in their lives and may seek to fulfill that need through giving. Among

individuals who perceive themselves to be in a good financial position, the motivation to support others is more often driven by a sense of social responsibility. In certain cultures, as observed in Türkiye, it is also a social expectation for individuals who experience an improvement in their financial situation to engage in charitable acts. Such social norms play a crucial role in shaping perceptions of economic status and influencing giving behavior.

In short, subjective assessments of economic well-being affect not only individuals' material resources but also their social roles and motivations. Therefore, it is not surprising that a relationship exists between economic perceptions and philanthropic and giving behavior. However, the direction of this relationship may vary depending on the individual's social environment, cultural context, and psychological disposition.

This study has examined three different forms of subjective assessments since 2004. One of these assessments addresses the impact of government policies over the past year on the household's economic situation. Respondents were asked whether, over the past year, government policies had a positive, negative, or negligible impact on their household's economic situation (Figure 3.3). The most favorable assessment in this category was recorded in 2004. At that time, the share of respondents who evaluated the government's policies as having had a negative effect on their household's economic situation was approximately 16%, whereas the share of those reporting a positive effect was more than two and a half times higher (42%). Since 2015, the group stating that government policies over the past year had a negative impact has not only become the largest but has continued to grow steadily - reaching 69% in 2024 (Figure 3.3).

FIGURE 3.3

In your opinion, how have the policies implemented by the current government over the past year impacted your household's economic situation? (%)




FIGURE 3.4

How satisfactory is your household's current economic situation? (%)





FIGURE 3.5

How do you expect
Türkiye's overall
economic situation to
develop over the next
year? (%)



When examining evaluations of the household's current economic well-being at the time of the fieldwork, a similar pattern emerges. The year in which the largest share of respondents reported a satisfactory economic situation was again 2004 (Figure 3.4). Since then, the group reporting an "unsatisfactory" economic situation has become the majority and has continued to grow. As of 2024, approximately two-thirds of the sample reported being dissatisfied with the impact of government policies on their household's economic well-being over the past year.

Projections about how respondents expected Türkiye's economy to change over the year following the fieldwork period were also recorded (Figure 3.5). Although this question was not asked in 2015, results from other years show that the most optimistic future outlook was recorded in 2004. At the time, nearly 60% of the sample expected conditions to improve in the year following 2004. By contrast, in 2024, only around 25% held this optimistic view, while the proportion of those with a pessimistic

outlook reached 55%—more than twice the size of the optimistic group.

In short, while our sample shows meaningful improvements in income and asset ownership over the past twenty years, subjective assessments of economic well-being have steadily deteriorated. This growing pessimism clearly harms philanthropic and giving behavior. Nonetheless, philanthropic and giving behavior is, of course, shaped by multiple variables. And, as is often the case, while some members of the sample express negative assessments, others report quite positive ones. As subjective economic assessments improve, philanthropic and giving behavior can be expected to increase; conversely, a deterioration in such assessments is likely to lead to a decline in these behaviors.

LIFE SATISFACTION

Ultimately, the most comprehensive outcome of all income, asset, and economic assessments is the individual's level of satisfaction with their life. This question is asked at the very beginning of each study, allowing respondents to provide their evaluation without the influence of preceding questions or topics. As shown in Figure 3.6 below, until 2021, a clear majority reported being satisfied with their lives. Although this group no longer constituted the majority after 2019, it still remained larger than the group of those who were dissatisfied up until 2024. By 2024, however, the proportion of respondents who were dissatisfied with their lives rose to nearly 50%, exceeding the proportion of satisfied respondents by 16 percentage points. These overall evaluations for 2024 highlight that subjective assessments were significantly more negative compared to previous years. In the sections that follow, we examine whether philanthropic and giving behavior based on what has been reported to us, is shaped primarily by income and assets, or by subjective economic evaluations and perceptions of life satisfaction.

IDEOLOGY: DISTRIBUTION ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE


We would expect political views to be related to philanthropic and giving behavior. People are likely to support philanthropic activities that align with their political stance, lifestyle, and values. We sought to identify respondents' political orientation using the simplest and most inclusive framework: asking them to place themselves along a left-right ideological scale.

The relationship between left- and right-leaning ideologies and philanthropic or giving behavior can largely be explained by how these ideologies shape individuals' perceptions of social responsibility, their forms of helping others, and their understanding of justice. Left-leaning ideologies are typically grounded in values of equality and social justice.

In this context, philanthropy and giving may be viewed as tools for reducing social inequalities. Individuals with left-leaning views may be more inclined to view acts of giving not as personal choices but as moral or societal obligations.

FIGURE 3.6

How satisfied are you with your life? (%)



Right-leaning ideologies, by contrast, tend to emphasize individual freedom and personal responsibility. From this perspective, philanthropy is seen more as a virtue exercised voluntarily by individuals. Rather than prioritizing social equality, right-leaning individuals may emphasize individual achievement and independence.

The left ideology generally advocates for the provision of social welfare through state mechanisms. Consequently, those who identify with the political left may favor publicly funded social programs over philanthropic initiatives that could reduce the role of the state. However, participation in CSOs or collective aid platforms is also common among individuals with left-leaning views. The right, on the other hand, tends to perceive the state's capacity to deliver social welfare as limited. Accordingly, individuals who lean politically right may believe that helping through CSOs, individual giving, and philanthropy is more effective and may support philanthropy as a matter of personal responsibility.

Left-leaning ideological views tend to emphasize a broader understanding of social responsibility and may focus on the significance of systemic inequalities within society. Individuals with leftist views may be more inclined to direct their donations toward collective goals such as addressing structural issues in education or healthcare. In contrast, right-leaning ideologies tend to frame social responsibility more in terms of individual agency. Those who support the political right may favor helping individuals whose personal efforts they wish to reward, such as by supporting someone's employment prospects.

Differences in how the two ideological camps view the economy also shape the ideological reflections of behavior and attitudes. The political left generally sees economic inequality as a structural problem. Accordingly, it may advocate for the redistribution of societal resources rather than charitable giving.

However, it may still regard giving as a temporary means of supporting less privileged groups. In

contrast, the political right emphasizes individual economic success and may regard giving as a voluntary sacrifice made from personal gain. Therefore, on the political right, giving may be regarded as an indicator of individuals' contribution to society.


Individuals with left-leaning views tend to direct their giving toward projects that promote societal change. In this context, for example, supporting social programs aimed at reducing social inequalities may be more common among those aligned with left-wing ideologies. On the other hand, from a right-leaning perspective, assistance may be more focused on improving individuals' lives at a personal level. In this context, individuals with right-leaning ideologies may be more inclined toward direct, person-to-person aid or giving motivated by religion. The more conservative segments of the political right may strongly embrace a notion of philanthropy rooted in religious beliefs and traditions. By contrast, left-leaning ideology tends to frame giving not in religious or traditional terms, but rather within the framework of humanistic values and social justice.

In conclusion, left- and right-wing ideologies can be expected to influence philanthropic and giving behavior in different ways. The political left emphasizes collective responsibility and focuses on addressing systemic inequalities, whereas the political right places greater value on individual responsibility and initiative. These differences can lead to a range of behavioral variations from the amount donated to the types of causes supported. Nevertheless, both ideological camps encourage contributing to society, albeit within their own value frameworks.

As shown in Figure 3.7, those placing themselves in the ideological center constituted the largest group in 2004, only one percentage point ahead of those identifying with the political right. Since 2015, the right has become by far the largest ideological group. However, the left has also shown a steady increase since 2004, reaching a level in 2024 that corresponds to one-third of the sample and surpasses the center to become the second-largest group.

FIGURE 3.7

Distribution on the
Left-Right scale (%)



This trend, which suggests that those previously positioned at the center have shifted toward both ends of the left-right scale, is undoubtedly indicative of growing ideological polarization among the electorate. It is reasonable to expect that this polarization would extend to attitudes toward philanthropy and patterns of giving. It is evident that philanthropic and giving behavior is shaped by a complex interplay of factors and cannot be explained by any single determinant alone. The key question at this point is whether individuals' ideological orientations continue to have a statistically significant effect—after accounting for the impact of income, asset ownership, subjective economic assessments, and life satisfaction, as well as relevant demographic controls. This question will also be addressed in a later section.

TRENDS IN RELIGIOSITY INDICATORS

Religiosity is generally regarded as a factor that encourages philanthropic and giving behavior. As in all religions, charitable giving is an integral part of faith and worship in Islam (particularly in the form of fitrah and zakat); thus, a strong relationship can be expected between Muslim religiosity and giving behavior. Various factors, such as the binding nature of religious commandments, spiritual fulfillment, social solidarity, and belief in the afterlife, shape the close link between Muslim religiosity, philanthropy, and giving behavior. In this context, Muslim individuals with higher levels of religiosity are expected to engage in philanthropic activities more frequently and more intensively.

Islam encompasses numerous principles that encourage individuals to provide material support to others. Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, obliges the allocation of a certain portion of one's wealth to those in need.⁵ In contexts where the political authority does not regulate zakat, this obligation effectively institutionalizes and regularizes giving behavior. As a voluntary form of giving, sadaqah refers to any material or non-material aid. In this framework, it encourages devout Muslims to engage in philanthropic acts in their daily lives. Fitrah or sadaqah is given to impoverished Muslims for whom one is not financially responsible.⁶ The financial support extended to those in need during Ramadan periodically reinforces Muslims' philanthropic habits.

For Muslims, charitable giving is closely tied to the desire to earn divine approval and accumulate spiritual merit. Given the expectation that philanthropic acts generate a sense of spiritual fulfillment and peace, it is reasonable to expect that individuals with higher levels of religiosity are more inclined to give. Islam teaches that individuals are responsible not only for themselves but also for the broader Muslim community (Ummah). This understanding reinforces the perception of philanthropy as a collective responsibility. Islam instills in individuals the belief that those they help are fellow believers, thereby reinforcing their motivation to give.

According to a widely accepted interpretation, Muslims regard life on earth as a temporary trial and a preparation for the afterlife. Giving is therefore understood as an act that will be rewarded in the hereafter. This belief is reinforced by concepts such as sadaqah jariyah (ongoing charity), which establishes a religious foundation for long-term societal

investments (such as education and healthcare institutions), based on the idea that a person can continue to earn merit even after death.

Zakat, sadaqah, and other forms of giving function not only as religious obligations but also as mechanisms of economic redistribution. These forms of giving are expected to contribute to reducing economic inequalities. The realization of this expectation, of course, depends on how these practices are carried out. Muslims are especially encouraged to give during Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. These periods mark the peak of philanthropic behavior, particularly through sadaqah, fitrah, and qurbani donations. Detailed inquiries were conducted to assess the prevalence and implementation of these practices. Broadly speaking, in Muslim communities, higher levels of religiosity are expected to correspond with the normalization of giving as a social norm and a marker of social acceptance. Philanthropy is also anticipated to reinforce individuals' sense of belonging to society and to enhance their social standing.


An examination of fundamental religiosity indicators since 2004 reveals virtually no change in the extent to which individuals consider themselves to be religious. The question "Regardless of how frequently you perform religious practices, to what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?" was asked using a scale ranging from (0) *not at all religious* to (10) *very religious*. Responses clustered between 6 and 10 (closer to the "very religious" end) have consistently been much more common than those between 0 and 4, which are closer to the "not at all religious" end (Figure 3.8). Only in 2019 did the share of those identifying as "not at all religious" reach around 20%; in other years, it remained around 10%. Due to factors beyond our control such as the demographic structure of the sample or the prevailing social climate at the time of fieldwork, the proportion of respondents identifying as religious fluctuated, increasing in some years and decreasing in others. However, by the end of this fluctuation, the levels had returned to their baseline position in 2004.

5 For details regarding the eligible recipients of zakat, see: <https://kurul.diyanet.gov.tr/Cevap-Ara/431/zekat-kimlere-verilir>

6 See: <https://kurul.diyanet.gov.tr/Cevap-Ara/454/fitir-sadakasi-kimlere-verilebilir-kimlere-verilemez>

FIGURE 3.8

Regardless of how frequently you perform religious practices, to what extent do you consider yourself religious? (%)




Respondents were also asked about the frequency of their religious practices. In 2004, the question was phrased as: “Over the past year, how often have you been able to go to the mosque, excluding funeral services?” In subsequent years, it was reformulated as: “Over the past year, how often have you performed prayer and engaged in worship?” (Figure 3.9). When mosque-based worship responses from 2004 are analyzed separately for men and women, we observe that, as expected, mosque attendance rates were significantly lower for women and higher for men. From 2015 onwards, non-mosque worship rates are higher for women than for men. For this reason, the mosque-based worship data presented here for 2004 reflect only the rates among men. Had the non-mosque worship question been included in 2004, we estimate that the share of high-frequency worship responses would likely have been even greater—potentially closer to the 2015 levels for “more than once a week.” However, this cannot be stated with certainty.

Since 2015 when both the share of respondents identifying as religious and the wording of the question remained consistent, the proportion of those who reported engaging in worship more than once a week decreased from 50% to 27% by 2024. An increase in all other response categories has accompanied this decline. However, it is essential to note that half of our sample, which represents Türkiye’s voting-age population, reports performing religious practices at least once a week. This figure has declined from approximately 67% to 50% over the past nine years.

In short, while the data indicate a decrease in worship frequency during this period, they do not reflect a corresponding decline in individuals’ self-perceived level of religiosity. Is philanthropic and giving behavior more closely shaped by reported frequency of worship, or by individuals’ subjective perceptions of their own religiosity and the extent to which they fulfill the obligations they associate with it? We will attempt to answer this question in the following sections.

FIGURE 3.9

Over the past year,
how often have you
performed prayer
and engaged in
worship? (%)



4. DIRECT GIVING TO THOSE IN NEED

In examining aid and giving behavior in Türkiye, donations made directly by individuals to recipients of their own choosing are assessed separately from those made through intermediary institutions. Continuing from the previous section, this part begins with an overview of to whom fitrah and zakat payments are being directed. It then proceeds with an examination of direct donations made to relatives, neighbors, other people in need, and beggars.

TRENDS IN FITRAH AND ZAKAT PAYMENTS


When we examine how the practices of paying fitrah and zakat or performing ritual sacrifice for religious reasons have evolved

among citizens of voting age who continue to regard themselves as highly religious despite the recent decline in worship practices, a striking decrease becomes apparent. 58% of respondents reported paying the fitrah amount set at 130 TL for 2024 by the High Council of Religious Affairs of the Presidency of Religious Affairs.⁷ Twenty years ago, this figure stood at 79%. The proportion of those who stated that they were not financially able to pay fitrah is 10%, a figure that has also increased compared to twenty years ago (Figure 4.1).

⁷ See: <https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Detay/36231/din-isleri-yuksek-kurulu-2024-yili-fitre-bedelini-130-tl-olarak-belirledi#>

FIGURE 4.1

Did you give fitrah during the previous Eid-al Fitr? (%)



It may be assumed that the fitrah amounts are not financially burdensome. Nevertheless, how can we interpret the approximately twenty-point decline in the proportion of respondents stating that they paid fitrah? Could this indicate the emergence of an adult population that no longer considers these payments as a religious obligation? Might it be an indication that religion is playing a less prominent role in daily life? These questions are undoubtedly significant. They can only be answered in a satisfactory manner through deeper inquiry, data collection, and continued monitoring of this trend over time.

Respondents were also asked where or to whom they paid their fitrah. Over the past twenty years, the share of payments made to relatives, acquaintances, or friends in need has risen from 52% to 59%, while payments to individuals in need who were not personally known have fallen from 40% to 26% (Figure 4.2). Payments made to imams, mosques, or other institutions have remained at a consistently low level. In other words, these payments have increasingly centered around people's immediate circles and have not taken on an institutional form.

FIGURE 4.2

Where or to whom
did you give your
fitrah? (%)





FIGURE 4.3

Did you give zakat
last year? (%)



Given that zakat payments depend on one's wealth, it is natural for these figures to fluctuate in line with broader economic developments. When we also consider trends in the economic outlook, we observe that the share of individuals stating they gave zakat has declined from 40% in 2004 to 23% in 2024. Meanwhile, the proportion of those stating that they could not afford to pay zakat has increased from 25% to 33% over the past twenty years (Figure 4.3).

According to the responses, zakat payments are also predominantly made to acquaintances, family members, and friends (Figure 4.4). In 2015 and 2019, any other individuals who are not personally known came to the fore, and in those same years, the proportion of respondents who did not wish to answer this question rose to around 17%. Zakat payments to an imam, mosque, or any institution have either consistently remained at very low levels or have not been mentioned at all among the responses to this open-ended question. In short, both fitrah and zakat payments are predominantly made to one's immediate circle;

the inclination to seek out and make these payments to a person in need who is not personally known remains secondary. Likewise, the tendency to fulfill the obligations of fitrah and zakat by donating to an institution capable of reaching such individuals also remains quite limited.

Respondents were also asked about the amount of fitrah and zakat they paid. The average amounts obtained were adjusted to 2024 prices to allow for comparison dating back to 2004. The striking finding here is that although the proportion of those who pay fitrah and zakat has declined, the average payment amounts appear to have increased in real terms (Figure 4.5). Despite a significant decline between 2004 and 2019, notable increases in the average fitrah and zakat payments were observed in 2021 and 2024. In other words, in the past two rounds of research, a smaller group appears to have made higher average payments.





FIGURE 4.4

Where or to whom
did you give your
zakat? (%)

FIGURE 4.5

Average fitrah and zakat giving adjusted to 2024 prices



The proportion of respondents who stated that they made qurbani donations for Eid al-Adha has also declined, similar to the trends observed in fitrah and zakat payments. While 57% of the sample reported having done so in 2004, this figure dropped to just 44% in 2024 (Figure 4.6). Although the share of those who report qurbani donations has decreased, there has been virtually no change over the past twenty years in the proportion citing financial constraints as the reason. What has changed is the increase in the proportion of those who stated they did not make qurbani donations without citing any financial reason.

One of the most defining characteristics of philanthropy and giving behavior in Türkiye is direct donations made to individuals' immediate circles. This defining trait of giving in the country was also observed in the payment of fitrah and zakat. This behavioral pattern

has been thoroughly analyzed in previous publications.⁸

To understand the prevalence of direct giving within the same framework, respondents were asked whether they had provided any material support (such as food, clothing, money, or fuel) to a relative, neighbor, or any other people in need over the past year.

49% of respondents stated that they had done so. This figure was 45% in 2021, 38% in 2019, and 34% in 2015 (Figure 4.7). In other words, the proportion of those who reported making direct cash or indirect donations has increased by fifteen points over the past nine years. However, considering that this figure was 44% in the first year of the study in 2004, the overall increase in direct donations over the past twenty years amounts to just five percentage points.

⁸ See. Campbell, D. A., & Çarkoğlu, A. (2019). Informal giving in Turkey. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 30, 738-753

FIGURE 4.6

Did you make
qurbani donations
during the previous
Eid-al-Adha? (%)





FIGURE 4.7

Over the past year, have
you personally provided
any material donations—
such as food, clothing,
money, or fuel support—
to a relative, neighbor,
or any other people in
need? (%)




Upon examining the nature of these donations, it is observed that among those who reported making direct donations in the past year, 13% donated food to relatives, 8% donated clothing, 18% gave cash, and 2% donated fuel (Figure 4.8).⁹ Looking at the distribution of donations made to relatives by type since 2004, it is evident that the share of each form of donation has declined significantly.

Indeed, these studies show that monetary donations have consistently been the most

frequently provided type of donation to relatives. While 42% reported giving cash in 2004, this figure dropped to just 18% in 2024. Food donations declined from 31% to 13%, while clothing donations dropped from 22% to 8%. It was previously observed that fitrah and zakat payments were primarily directed toward one's immediate circle, particularly relatives, and that there has been a significant decrease in this area as well. Similarly, the rate of direct donation is also declining.

FIGURE 4.8

Type of donations made to relatives (%)



⁹ Fuel donations were not included in the survey in 2004.

A similar decline is observed in nearly all types of donations made to both neighbours and other people in need (Figures 4.9 and 4.10). Among those who reported making direct donations in the past year, 16% stated that they gave cash to neighbours, while 24% reported giving cash to other people in need. Monetary donations made to other people in need were recorded at 60% in the 2021 study. While the proportion of those who made monetary donations to people in need

other than relatives and neighbours increased significantly between 2004 and 2021, it fell to 24% in 2024, the lowest level recorded to date. The proportion of respondents stating that they donate clothing or provide fuel has also declined compared to 2004. It is essential to underline that these figures refer to individuals who reported having made direct donations to a relative, neighbor, or other people in need in the past year—corresponding to approximately half of the sample.





FIGURE 4.9

Types of donations
made to neighbours
(%)

FIGURE 4.10

Types of donations made to other people in need (%)



The distribution of the total estimated value of all donations by recipient group (relatives, neighbours, other people in need), is presented in Figure 4.11. Overall, the amount of donations made to relatives is higher compared to other groups: 49% of donations made to relatives is valued at 1,100 TL or above, whereas this figure stands at 39% for donations made to

neighbours and 31% for donations made to other people in need. However, when compared to 2021, these rates appear to have declined for relatives, while increasing for neighbours and others. In 2021, 61% of respondents stated that they gave 251 TL or more to relatives (at 2021 values), 37% to neighbours, and 32% to other people in need.

FIGURE 4.11

Approximate total
amount of direct
giving for 2021 and
2024 (proportions
among those who
reported a figure)





FIGURE 4.12

What is the main reason you did not give through an organization? (%)



We also inquired why individuals prefer giving directly rather than through an organization. The responses to this question are presented in Figure 4.12. As of 2024, 30% of participants stated that they did not give through organizations because they give irregularly and only when they come across someone in need. An even higher proportion (43%) stated that the reason was the small amount of donations made. A further 13% stated that they did not trust the relevant organizations. The proportion of those who stated that they are not familiar with these organizations has remained at 9% since 2004.

Before the 2021 study, the most frequently cited reason for not giving through an organization was that the amount given was too small. In 2021, however, the share of respondents giving this response dropped from over 50% in previous years to 24%. By 2024, this reason once again became the most frequently cited, with the proportion rising back to 43%. Conversely, the proportion of respondents who stated that they donated only at irregular intervals, when they came across someone in need, had risen to 45% in 2021—up from the 21–26% range observed in earlier years. In 2024,

this figure appears to have declined to 30%. However, the share of this group rose from 21% in 2004 to 30%. By contrast, the share of respondents citing the small size of the donation as their reason declined from 53% in 2004 to 43% in 2024.

INFORMAL GIVING TO INDIVIDUALS
ENGAGED IN STREET BEGGING

A significant component of direct donations or aid in Türkiye is the money given to individuals engaged in street begging. As seen in our previous studies, this form of giving is quite widespread. When respondents were asked whether they give money to beggars on the street, 46% answered affirmatively, which is slightly lower than the 51% recorded in 2021 (Figure 4.13). This figure is nearly identical to the proportion observed in 2004.

Respondents who stated that they give money to beggars on the street were asked to estimate the total amount they had given over the past month. The average amount reported in response to this question was 109 TL, which corresponds to the same value as in 2021 when adjusted for inflation. In other words, the average amount of money given to individuals engaged in street begging has increased in line with inflation and maintained the same level as in 2021.




FIGURE 4.13

Do you give money to
people begging on
the street? (%)

ESTIMATED VALUE OF DIRECT DONATIONS

This section presents the per capita monetary value of all forms of direct donations covered: donations made to relatives, neighbours, and other people in need, money given to individuals engaged in street begging, and fitrah and zakat payments. The amounts reported for 2015, 2019, and 2021 have been adjusted for inflation and are expressed in 2024 values (in Turkish Lira) to enable comparability. Accordingly, as of 2024, the per capita value of donations made to relatives over the past year was calculated as 573 TL, representing a slight decline compared to 2021. Donations made to the neighbours changed very little compared to 2021, reaching 285 TL. Donations to other people in need once again showed a substantial increase, as observed in 2021, and reached 806 TL. Thus, among all forms of direct giving, the highest per capita amount appears to have been directed toward individuals other than relatives and neighbours. Unlike fitrah and zakat payments, which are primarily directed toward one's immediate circle, informal giving appears to be oriented mainly toward individuals who are neither acquaintances nor relatives.

The annual per capita value of donations to beggars declined compared to 2021, calculated at approximately 552 TL, which is close to the 2015 level. It should be emphasized that this figure was calculated by annualizing the average amount given to beggars in the past month. These figures should be interpreted under the assumption that the amount given in the past month was repeated in each month of the year. As previously emphasized, the per capita fitrah payment is estimated at 633 TL, and the zakat payment at 1,130 TL. Within this comparative framework, the average per capita value of fitrah and zakat payments exceeds that of all other forms of direct giving made without the involvement of an organization. The combined per capita average of fitrah and zakat payments is also higher than donations made through organizations.

As in previous studies, the 2024 study includes a detailed examination of donations made through organizations. Before assessing all donations—both direct and those made through organizations—within a comparative framework, let us first examine donations made through organizations.

5. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF PHILANTHROPY

Before examining giving behavior through organizations, we turn to how the public in Türkiye perceives philanthropy.

The question of who should bear responsibility for helping those in need and implementing related social policies has long been a key topic of debate in the fields of political science, public policy, and civil society.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the historical evolution of public preferences on this issue between 2004 and 2024. Over these 20 years, the majority have consistently believed that helping those in need is primarily the responsibility of the state (ranging between 38% and 43%). This finding reflects a pattern consistent with Türkiye's statist tradition.

Following the state, those who believe that helping those in need is the responsibility of "well-off citizens" and of "all citizens", respectively, appear to have maintained their positions as the second and third-ranked categories. However, both categories have seen a notable decline. For example, the proportion of those who believe that helping those in need is primarily the responsibility of well-off citizens dropped from 31% in 2004 to 23% in 2024. Similarly, the proportion of those who believe

this responsibility lies with all citizens declined from 21% in 2004 to 16% in 2024.

On the other hand, although the share of those who believe that civil society organizations are responsible for helping those in need remains lower than the other three categories, it has shown an apparent increase over time, rising from 5% in 2004 to 11% in 2024. Given the scale and depth of social issues, it is of critical importance, particularly in societies like Türkiye, for the state, civil society, and individuals to all take an active role in tackling key societal problems such as poverty. In this regard, a growing perception that civil society should bear greater responsibility is a positive development, both in terms of sharing the state's burden and in enabling civil society to assume a monitoring and guiding role.

It is essential to recognize that long-term, planned, and sustainable programs led by the state and civil society organizations have far greater potential to deliver effective solutions than irregular and unpredictable forms of informal individual giving. In this context, the increase in the proportion of those who believe that helping those in need is the responsibility of civil society rather than individual citizens can be considered a positive development.

Finally, the proportion of those who believe that helping those in need is the responsibility of religious citizens has remained relatively stable between 2004 and 2024, fluctuating between 4% and 5%.

WHICH ORGANIZATIONS COME TO MIND FIRST?

To understand public awareness of foundations and associations operating in Türkiye, participants were asked to name the first foundation or association that came to mind. Trends in awareness over time show that the

Turkish Red Crescent has consistently ranked first throughout the study period.

However, there has been a noticeable decline over time in the proportion of respondents who named Turkish Red Crescent as the first organization that comes to mind. While 27% and 29% of respondents recalled Turkish Red Crescent first in 2015 and 2019, respectively, this figure dropped to 22% in 2024. One of the most notable changes highlighted in Figure 5.2 is that the Ahbap Association, founded in 2017, had become one of the first associations to come to mind for 11% of respondents by 2024.

FIGURE 5.1

In your opinion, who holds the primary responsibility for helping those in need? (%)





FIGURE 5.2

Which of the foundations and associations operating in Türkiye comes to your mind first? (%)




Another significant finding is that the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority under the Prime Ministry (AFAD) is perceived by many citizens as a civil society organization. AFAD's prominent role in coordinating aid efforts following the 2023 Kahramanmaraş Earthquakes may have contributed to its being named by 8% of respondents as the first organization that came to mind.

On the other hand, a notable decline has been observed in the recognition levels of the Turkish Aeronautical Association and the Child Protection Agency since 2015. In the case of the Child Protection Agency, this decline may be attributed to the fact that, like AFAD, it is a public institution, and its official name was changed in 2011 to the General Directorate of Child Services.

FIGURE 5.3

The following statements reflect different understandings of what constitutes philanthropy. To what extent do you agree that each one represents a philanthropic activity? (%)



HOW IS PHILANTHROPY PERCEIVED?

To understand which types of giving the public associates with philanthropy, participants were asked whether they consider the various forms of giving listed in Figure 5.3 to be philanthropic activities. Giving money to those in need was considered an act of philanthropy by 83% in 2015, whereas this figure declined to 79% in 2024. Similarly, education-focused donations, such as supporting students, providing scholarships, and funding the construction of schools and dormitories, were considered philanthropic by 85% in 2015; this figure declined to 77% in 2024.

The share of those who view zakat payments as a form of philanthropy also decreased, falling from 80% in 2015 to 71% in 2024. The proportion of those who consider volunteering activities as a form of philanthropy remained relatively stable, measured at 68% in 2015 and 66% in 2024.

By contrast, a striking decline was observed in the share of those who view helping people in need anywhere in the world—regardless of religion or nationality—as an act of philanthropy. While this figure stood at 84% in 2015, it dropped to 59% in 2024. This trend suggests that the concept of philanthropy is becoming increasingly “nationalized”. This change can be explained with the recent economic downturn and changes in the perception of people in need in Türkiye following the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquake.

The proportion of those who consider donating some of their wealth to civil society organizations as an act of philanthropy declined from 65% in 2015 to 55% in 2024. The most significant shift in perceptions of philanthropy, however, appears to be in relation to funding the construction of mosques.

While 80% of respondents viewed it as a philanthropic act in 2015, this figure dropped to 50% in 2024. No significant change was observed in the amount of those who consider cultural and artistic activities to be acts of philanthropy; this figure remained relatively stable at 42% in 2015 and 40% in 2024.

These findings suggest that public perceptions of philanthropy in Türkiye remain shaped mainly by economic and educational needs. At the same time, there are strong indications that the concept of giving has shifted from a more cosmopolitan perspective to addressing local needs.

REPUTATION OF CSOS

This section concludes by examining the public’s perception of civil society organizations (CSOs). The findings reveal that public perceptions of these organizations remain constrained in key areas (Figure 5.4).

Only 35% of respondents believe that CSOs are transparent and accountable. The proportion of those who think that donations are used as intended remains similarly limited at 37%. Similarly, 39% believe that CSOs inform donors about how their contributions are used.

The proportion of those who believe that CSOs accurately understand the needs of recipients stands at 46%, while 48% consider them capable of solving problems. Finally, 51% of respondents believe that making donations through CSOs is important—a figure that ranks higher than the other indicators.

These findings highlight the need for CSOs to strengthen their public image by increasing their transparency, accountability, and communication.

FIGURE 5.4

To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (%)



◆ I Agree

6. FACTORS CONSIDERED WHEN SELECTING AN ORGANIZATION FOR DONATIONS

As previously noted, in-kind and cash donations are frequently made through informal channels, without the involvement of organizations, and instead directed to individuals' acquaintances, neighbors, relatives, or friends. Religiously motivated payments, such as fitrah and zakat, are made predominantly through informal means, most often directly to relatives, friends, or neighbors. However, in our 2021 study, we also observed an increase in donations made through organizations. Understanding what drives individuals' choice of organization for giving is a central focus of this study. To clarify this issue, we conducted a conjoint analysis.

Conjoint analysis is a methodological approach commonly used in marketing research to elicit individuals' preferences for specific attributes of a product or service. In recent years, it has also been used to understand how voters make choices between candidates or political parties. This method involves analyzing participants' preferences by presenting them with a series of options that comprise different combinations of attributes and their variations. It is particularly used to determine the extent to which specific attributes of a product, service, political candidate, or party influence consumer or voter decision-making.

In our sample, participants were presented with information about potential recipient organizations based on six attributes in the 2024 study and four attributes in the 2021 study. For each organization presented, they were asked to evaluate the likelihood of making a donation equivalent to one-fortieth of their monthly income using a scale ranging from (0) *no chance at all* to (10) *would definitely donate*. After defining the different levels for each attribute of the organizations, we constructed profiles of potential recipient organizations based on various combinations of these attribute levels.

A potential technical consideration at this point is how many levels each of the four or six attributes includes, and how these combinations shape the set of possible profiles. In the 2024 study, six distinct areas of work were identified for the organizations featured in the profiles. These were defined as organizations working to: provide healthcare to all in need; prevent environmental pollution; ensure equal opportunity in education; promote access to cultural and artistic activities; prevent violence against women; and address problems in regions affected by natural disasters. It is clear that these areas of work do not encompass the full range of civil society organization (CSO) activities in Türkiye. However, there is a direct relationship between the number of areas included and the feasibility of experimental design. To illustrate, if each of the remaining five areas includes two levels, we are faced with a total of $6 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 = 192$ possible organizational profile combinations. Using a full factorial design that includes all of these combinations in a survey would be unrealistic, as it would be neither feasible to ask participants to evaluate that many profiles nor reasonable to expect them to distinguish meaningfully between them. Instead, we opted for a fractional factorial design. Rather than using all possible combinations, a statistically meaningful and representative subset of 16 profiles was selected. Each of these sixteen profiles was randomly assigned in sets of four to one of four randomly defined groups in our survey. In other words, each respondent evaluated four randomly selected profiles from the set of sixteen. This approach allowed us to generate four times as many observations as the number of participants in our sample for the profile evaluations. Since both

the four subgroups within our sample and the profiles assigned to each group were determined randomly, we analyzed the differences in the average ratings received by the profiles based on their attribute levels.

The five organizational attributes, aside from areas of work, were as follows:

- i. Whether it is easy to access information about the organization's budget and expenditures,
- ii. Whether the organization consistently prioritizes integrity, fairness, and justice in their work,
- iii. The gender composition of the organization's leadership team (predominantly women or predominantly men),
- iv. Whether the organization operates at the local or national level,
- v. Whether the organization has a short-term impact—such as a few weeks—or a long-term and meaningful impact—spanning several years—on the lives of its target group.

Table 6.1 presents the main findings from the analysis of the profile evaluations. These findings reflect the average likelihood of donating (on a 0 to 10 scale) based on participants' responses to different combinations of organizational profiles. The reference profile refers to the average donation likelihood rating given by a male respondent who does not speak Kurdish, is not Alevi, is at the lowest levels of age, education, income, and religiosity, and has not made a fitrah or zakat payment for an organization that provides healthcare to all in need. This rating is 4.7 out of 10. As we move down the first column, we see how the likelihood of donating changes for a respondent with the same characteristics, depending on the organization's area of work. An organization working to prevent environmental pollution or to promote equal opportunity in education receives a slightly lower likelihood rating. There is no statistically significant difference between organizations operating in the fields of environment and education and those in the reference category of healthcare.

An organization working to prevent violence against women receives a slightly lower average rating of 4.4. In contrast, the lowest rating is given to organizations working to improve access to cultural and artistic activities. When all other organizational and respondent characteristics are held constant, the highest donation likelihood rating is given to organizations working to address problems in regions affected by natural disasters. When we move rightward from the 5.3 value in the bottom row of the “area of work” section, we see that defining the same organization as one where it is easy to access information about its budget and expenditures raises the donation likelihood from 5.3 to 5.7. This suggests that financial transparency results in a significant increase in the likelihood of making a reference donation, as shown in the first column.

Whether an organization consistently upholds integrity, fairness, and justice in its

work—or occasionally compromises on these principles—is the single most influential factor affecting donation likelihood. Across all fields of work, consistently emphasizing these principles results in donation likelihoods ranging from 5.6 to 6.9 out of 10. Organizations that work to address problems in regions affected by natural disasters and consistently emphasize integrity, fairness, and justice have the highest average donation likelihood scores, at 6.9 out of 10.

Organizations whose leadership teams are predominantly composed of women also receive higher average donation likelihood scores than the reference. In other words, the values in the fourth column are consistently higher than those in the first column. However, this positive effect is approximately one-seventh the size of the impact associated with consistently emphasizing the principles of integrity, fairness, and justice.

Likelihood of donating to organizations with different profiles
(0 “no chance at all” – 10 “I would definitely donate”), 2024

TABLE 6.1

	Male; does not speak Kurdish; not Alevi; lowest levels of age, education, income, and religiosity; has not given fitrah or zakat	Budget and expenditure information is easily accessible	Always emphasizes integrity, fairness, and justice in its work	Leadership team is predominantly composed of women	Has a short-term (e.g., a few weeks) but meaningful impact on the lives of its target population	Operates at the local level
Works to provide healthcare to all in need	4.7	5.1	6.2	4.9	4.4	4.5
Works to prevent environmental pollution	4.6	5.0	6.2	4.9	4.3	4.5
Works to ensure equal opportunity in education	4.6	5.0	6.2	4.9	4.3	4.5
Works to improve access to cultural and artistic activities	4.1	4.5	5.6	4.3	3.8	3.9
Works to prevent violence against women	4.4	4.8	5.9	4.6	4.0	4.2
Works to address problems in regions affected by natural disasters	5.3	5.7	6.9	5.6	5.0	5.2

The likelihood of donating to an organization that operates locally rather than nationally, and whose work has only a short-term impact on the lives of its target population, is also lower compared to the reference likelihood. The effect of operating at the local level is not statistically significant at the expected threshold. In other words, whether an organization operates at the local or national level does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of making a donation. By contrast, while the negative effect of a short-term impact is relatively modest, it is statistically significant and leads to a lower likelihood of donation.

In the 2021 study, we again used six areas of work but included only three organizational attributes. We present a summary of the key donation likelihoods at a similar table below (Table 6.2). These probabilities in this study were again measured using the same scale, with the donation amount set at one-fortieth of monthly income. As in 2024, working in the field of culture and arts consistently results in the lowest likelihood of donation across all profiles. When different areas of work are presented, their relative advantages in attracting donations

become evident, with clear distinctions between them. The fact that culture and arts face the most significant difficulty in attracting donations is likely closely tied to the other areas of work it is presented alongside, as well as to how culture and arts activities are defined.

Among these areas, working on poverty alleviation and addressing problems in regions affected by disasters—both of which generate a strong sense of urgent need—significantly enhances an organization’s ability to attract donations. The budget transparency attribute—used in the same way in the 2024 study as in 2021—remained the most influential factor in increasing the likelihood of donation. Transparency and the appropriate use of donations were also found to be highly significant in our previous studies. This study likewise demonstrates the same differentiating impact. Whether donations were received electronically via credit card or bank transfer, or in cash with a receipt, did not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of donation in the 2021 study. In contrast, emphasizing conservative values is associated with a lower likelihood of donation.

TABLE 6.2

Likelihood of donating to organizations with different profiles (0 “no chance at all” – 10 “I would definitely donate”), 2021


	Male; does not speak Kurdish; not Alevi; lowest levels of age, education, income, and religiosity; has not given fitrah or zakat	Budget and expenditure information is easily accessible	Emphasizes conservative values in its image	Collects donations via credit card or wire transfer
Works in the field of healthcare	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.3
Works on environmental issues	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.3
Works in the field of education	5.6	5.8	5.3	5.5
Works in the field of arts and culture	4.9	5.1	4.6	4.8
Works in the field of human rights	5.2	5.3	4.9	5.1
Works in the field of poverty relief	5.8	6.0	5.5	5.7

We expanded the study we had initiated in 2021 with a small conjoint module in the 2024 round. Had we assessed the impact of each factor on donation likelihood individually, we would not have been able to observe the effect of how different combinations of these factors interact. Here, however, we can clearly see that different combinations produce distinct effects.

Since the 2019 study, we have also been asking another question: “From a personal standpoint, which of the following factors matters most when deciding whether to donate to an organization?” This closed-ended question had five possible response options. Respondents were then asked a follow-up question: “And which of the following is the second most important to you?” The distribution of all responses is presented in Figure 6.1 below. As of 2024, “the trust that the organization will use the donations in line with their intended purpose” emerges as the most important factor. This is followed by “transparent

and easily understandable financial accounts of the organization”.

This finding, which aligns closely with the results of the conjoint analysis presented earlier, reaffirms the critical importance of transparency and accountability in giving. In line with the conjoint analysis findings, the organization’s area of work—and respondents’ affinity with it—emerges as the third most influential factor. In 2021, the smallest share of respondents identified alignment with the organization’s political stance or worldview—reflected in an emphasis on conservative values in its public image—as the most important factor in their donation decisions. However, the share of this group has more than tripled since 2019. An additional factor not covered in the conjoint analysis—whether the organization is able to reach those in need easily—ranks as the fourth most frequently selected option, surpassing alignment with the organization’s political stance.



◆ 2024 ◆ 2021 ◆ 2019

FIGURE 6.1

Which of the following is the most important factor in your decision to donate to any organization? (%)

We have been consistently examining the various factors that influence individuals' giving behavior using the same framework since 2019. It is worth highlighting several key factors that stand out in this survey. A typical pattern observed in such assessments is that each factor tends to be considered important by a large group. This is once again the case here. These groups can only be distinguished based on their relative size.

In 2024, the least influential factor in encouraging donations over the past 12 months, whether everyone in the family donates, still accounted for 58% of respondents (Figure 6.2). The desire to help those in need has consistently emerged as the leading motivating factor across all three studies. In other words, this personal drive to offer support is considered more important than the organization's structural characteristics. As seen in both the conjoint analysis and responses to the previous question, trust in the organization receiving the donation emerges as the second most important factor. Two other factors, which were found to be nearly as important, are the belief in the need for collective action to address social issues and the perceived importance of the issue the organization works on. Awareness of the potential to create change in the area supported by the donation is also considered significant. We also observe that the desire to set an example for others (70%) and the severity of the social challenge experienced (67%) are cited as reasons for making a donation. This final factor was likely triggered by the large-scale disasters that affected the country. About two out of every three respondents in our sample stated that their faith motivated them to make a donation, while the least commonly cited reason—supported by 58%—was the view that “everyone in my family donates.” In other words, despite the lower reported frequency of worship, a high level of subjective religiosity persists, and for two-thirds of the sample, there is a supportive link between making donations and their personal belief systems.


When we examine the factors that would encourage more donations in the next 12 months, we observe findings that reinforce some of the patterns identified earlier (Figure 6.3). Foremost among these is the idea that having more information about organizations and their activities would support giving in the future. Although it has declined compared to 2021, having more disposable income remains the second most important factor in 2024. The third most influential factor—steadily rising since 2019—is the increased likelihood of donating when individuals are directly asked to give.

Another finding that reinforces and builds on earlier results is the strong agreement that confidence in how a donation will be used significantly increases the likelihood of making a donation. Similarly, there is a shared view that greater transparency would encourage more giving. Likewise, affinity with the organization's area of work remains a motivating factor for donations. There is also support for the view that better regulation of civil society would encourage greater giving. While support for the view that easier donation methods would serve as an incentive is gradually increasing, it is still endorsed by only 57% of the overall sample.

Similarly, only 53% of respondents indicated that the presence of workplace giving would motivate them to make a donation in the next 12 months. Only 45% of respondents agreed that tax incentives would encourage them to make a donation. Among the participants in the sample, there is no widespread consensus on how workplace-related programs might support giving, philanthropy, or civil society. We did not measure the level of knowledge on this issue. However, the relatively low support is likely partly since a significant portion of respondents are employed in the informal sector and therefore have limited engagement with workplace giving programs or tax incentives.

FIGURE 6.2


Which of the following motivated you to make a donation in the past 12 months? (%)



◆ 2024 ◆ 2021 ◆ 2019

FIGURE 6.3

Which of the following would encourage you to donate more in the next 12 months? (%)



7. DONATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES

Since 2004, our research has examined in detail how individuals in Türkiye engage with various civil society organizations (CSOs). Participation has been assessed through four key forms of engagement: membership in various CSOs, attendance at meetings, volunteering, and donations beyond membership fees. In our survey, questions were asked not only based on generic CSO activity areas, but also by naming ten specific organizations: Turkish Red Crescent, TEMA Foundation, IHH, TÜRGEV, TEGV, LÖSEV, Darüşşafaka Society, Ahbap Association, TEV, and AKUT. We asked respondents whether they had participated in any of four types of activity (membership, volunteering, attending meetings, and making donations other than membership fees) with 25 different types of organizations listed using generic category names. These included, among others: sports clubs, youth/student organizations, human rights organizations, labor unions, village or urban development and solidarity associations, cultural, artistic, folklore, and music organizations, school construction associations, political parties, development cooperatives, alumni associations, organizations supporting refugees, and organizations combating poverty.

For the ten specified organizations, we once again inquired about all activities except membership.

As shown in the figures below, across the four rounds of research conducted to date, various generic and named organizations have been added to or removed from the list over time. For example, organizations providing aid to those affected by natural disasters were not included in our list before 2021. This addition aimed to capture the increase in activity related to floods, wildfires, and earthquakes in 2021 and 2023. In contrast, several organizations featured in previous studies such as the Child Protection Agency (ÇEK), Turkish Aeronautical Association (THK), Ensar Foundation, Kimse Yok Mu Solidarity and Aid Association, and the Association for Supporting Contemporary Life (ÇYDD) were not included in the 2024 study. The primary reason for this adjustment is that, for some organizations, there were virtually no observations across the four types of engagement we measured. To facilitate a more nuanced analysis of varying levels of participation, the list was expanded to include organizations with a higher likelihood of observed engagement.

Figure 7.1 illustrates the frequency of participation across different activity types since 2004. The most notable pattern here is the significant increase in participation rates after a period of decline following 2004 in the last two survey rounds. While only 18% of respondents in 2004 reported making a donation other than membership fees in the past year, this figure dropped to 13% in 2015 and 15% in 2019, before rising to 22% in 2021 and reaching 35% in 2024. As expected, the

inclusion of a few additional generic and named organizations slightly increased the overall donation rate. As in previous years, donations other than membership fees remain considerably more common than volunteering, membership, or attending meetings. However, in 2024, while rates of meeting attendance and membership declined, volunteering remained at a similar level. In other words, the slight increase in overall participation is primarily driven by a nearly 60% rise in non-membership donations.

FIGURE 7.1

Participation in different types of CSO activities, 2004-2024 (%)





FIGURE 7.2

Could you please indicate whether you have done each of the following in the past month? (%)




Although changes in philanthropy and giving behavior are not directly comparable with our study, similar patterns can also be observed in the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)¹⁰ research on giving, volunteering, and helping behavior. Figure 7.2 summarizes the findings from four CAF studies conducted between 2014 and 2023 alongside the results from our own research conducted in 2015, 2019, 2021, and 2024, using the same questions over the same

period. Unlike our own activity measurement, which uses a one-year reference period, the CAF question employs a one-month reference period. In its current format, it is not particularly suitable for Muslim-majority societies such as Türkiye. Due to the concentration of donation and aid activities around the month of Ramadan, which falls on different dates each year according to the lunar calendar, fieldwork conducted outside of Ramadan tends to show lower levels of giving and solidarity behavior when using a one-month reference period.

¹⁰ See. Charities Aid Foundation. (n.d.). World giving index. CAF. <https://www.cafonline.org/insights/research/world-giving-index>

FIGURE 7.3

Membership rates,
2004-2024 (%)



2024 2021 2019 2015 2004

We previously discussed the divergence in CAF results for 2020, which coincided with the pandemic period, in the 2021 report. The most recent CAF study in 2023 was also conducted in Türkiye in September 2023. Clearly, this study was not conducted in the earthquake-affected region. Fieldwork nonetheless took place in other parts of the country almost exactly one year prior to our own data collection in August–September 2024 and reflects the impact of the ongoing earthquake-related relief efforts at the time.¹¹ Primarily for this reason, our results for donations made and help extended to strangers in the past month are considerably lower than those reported by CAF. It is clear that the 2023 CAF study was conducted closer in time to the Kahramanmaraş and Hatay earthquakes than the fieldwork for our own study, which took place in August–September 2024. We believe that the main difference between our findings may stem from this temporal proximity to an exceptional period.

Figure 7.3 presents the percentages of respondents who reported being members of generic and specified organizations across the five studies conducted between 2004 and 2024. Organizations with membership rates below a certain threshold were excluded from these figures to ensure clarity and facilitate interpretation. In 2024, thirteen of the twenty-six generic organizations evaluated recorded their highest membership rates since 2004. For example, while no respondents reported membership in environmental or animal rights organizations in 2004, these organizations had the highest membership rate in 2024, at 2.3%. Organizations that help those affected by natural disasters—introduced as a generic category for the first time in 2024—rank second with a membership rate of 2.2%. While professional chambers had membership rates below 1% from 2004 to 2021, this figure rose to

1.9% in 2024. Compared to 2021, membership in political parties and sports clubs has declined, whereas membership rates for charitable organizations and aid associations, religious associations and foundations, labor unions, and women’s associations have approximately doubled. Organizations working with children, with a membership rate of 0.7%, ranked as the tenth among the 26 generic organizations with the highest reported membership.

When interpreting these increases, it is important to keep in mind that all of these rates remain very low and fall below the threshold for statistical significance in survey studies. In other words, the likelihood that the observed rates may vary across studies is relatively high.


Similarly, when we look at participation in volunteering, the organizations that show notable increases largely overlap with those that stood out in terms of membership. However, assessments of volunteering were also conducted for 10 specific organizations. In 2024, the volunteer participation rate for 13 out of the 36 generic and named organizations was the highest observed since 2004. In other words, record-level participation was observed in approximately one-third of the organizations assessed in 2024. The most notable increase is observed in Turkish Red Crescent (Figure 7.4). However, generically defined organizations assisting those affected by natural disasters rank second after Turkish Red Crescent.

The Ahbap Association, which drew attention with its activities following the Kahramanmaraş and Hatay earthquakes, ranks eleventh in terms of volunteer engagement. While volunteering in political parties has declined, there appears to be an increase in volunteering within professional chambers, environmental and animal rights organizations, charity organizations, sports clubs, religious associations and foundations, and women’s organizations. It should be noted, however, that these rates remain below the threshold of statistical significance.

¹¹ The CAF fieldwork dates for Türkiye are given as 7 September–7 December 2023. Detailed information is available at: https://www.gallup.com/file/services/177797/World_Poll_Dataset_Details_031524.pdf

FIGURE 7.4

Volunteering rates,
2004-2024 (%)




◆ 2024 ◆ 2021 ◆ 2019 ◆ 2015 ◆ 2004

Figure 7.5 presents the participation rates in meetings of 36 different generic and named organizations between 2004 and 2024. Following 2021, participation in meetings of political parties and hometown associations declined, while a

slight increase was observed for sports clubs, religious associations and foundations, charity and aid organizations, professional chambers, women's associations, the Turkish Red Crescent, and environmental and animal rights organizations.

FIGURE 7.5

Participation in
meetings, 2004-2024
(%)



Figures 7.6a and 7.6b illustrate how non-membership donations, the most commonly observed activity across all types of engagement, were distributed across 36 different generic and named organizations between 2004 and 2024. In terms of donation activity, the Turkish Red Crescent stands out even more prominently, exceeding its already notable performance in volunteering, membership, and even meeting participation. In 2004, nearly 2% of respondents reported making non-membership donations to Turkish Red Crescent. This figure exceeded 3% in 2015, reached around 5% in 2019, and rose to approximately 7.5% in 2021. By 2024, the rate stands at roughly 12%. The Turkish Red Crescent stands out as the most successful organization in this regard, having received donations from one in every ten individuals of voting age.

In 2021, its closest follower in terms of donations was TEMA Foundation, which received non-membership donations from nearly 5% of respondents. By 2024, however, TEMA's donation rate appears to have declined to around 3%, likely as a result of the increased prominence of disaster-related giving. Considering that TEMA's donation rate was below 1% in 2019, this represents nearly a threefold increase in performance. LÖSEV, which showed a slight decline in 2021, appears to have rebounded in 2024, receiving donations from nearly 7% of respondents. Similarly, İHH has shown a consistently upward trend, receiving donations from nearly 4% of respondents. Ahbap Association, included in our list for the first time, appears to have received donations from nearly 6% of participants—surpassing more established institutions such as İHH, TEMA, Darüşşafaka Society, and TEV. This points not only to the importance of disaster-related giving but also to the presence of a dynamic landscape that is open to new organizations and approaches.


In 2024, a notable and meaningful increase in donation activity was also observed across many generically defined organizations. For example, the proportion of respondents who

reported donating to charity organizations, environmental and animal rights organizations, healthcare and hospital development organizations, and school construction associations more than doubled. However, it is worth noting that school construction associations have experienced a significant long-term decline since 2004. Of the 36 named and generic organizations, thirteen report donation rates of 2% or higher. Additionally, nine other organizations receive donations from more than 1% of respondents. These figures indicate that the nationwide donation rates observed over the past year are significantly higher than those recorded in previous years.

In short, when we examine membership, participation in meetings, volunteering, and giving behavior, we observe a rapidly evolving and dynamic landscape. Although forms of engagement such as volunteering, attending meetings, and membership—which require greater effort, and time, and imply a formal sense of affiliation and support—appear relatively stable and less prone to fluctuation, certain organizations have nonetheless demonstrated notable progress in these areas. However, the most significant change is observed in the rates of non-membership donations. Figure 7.1 presents a comparative overview of membership, volunteering, meeting attendance, and donation rates from 2004 to the present. Those who engaged in at least one of these four activities were also grouped separately under “any form of participation”. The total rate of active individuals within the voting-age population has increased by approximately 56% over the past two decades, reaching 36%. However, this rise is primarily driven by the increase in the proportion of individuals making donations. Membership, participation in meetings, and volunteering rates have all shown significant increases compared to 2004; however, between 2021 and 2024, they have either plateaued or declined. For example, compared to 2004, participation in meetings and volunteering more than doubled, while membership rose by approximately 57%.

FIGURE 7.6a


Donation rates - 1,
2004-2024 (%)



◆ 2024 ◆ 2021 ◆ 2019 ◆ 2015 ◆ 2004

FIGURE 7.6b

Donation rates - 2,
2004-2024 (%)



This raises the question of how many different organizations, on average, an individual engages with through activities such as membership, donation, volunteering, or attending meetings. The participation rates summarized in Figure 7.1 indicate the percentage of individuals within each sample who engaged in a given activity. For example, in 2024, 12.6%—that is, 177 individuals—reported having volunteered with the organizations included in the survey. If everyone had volunteered with only one organization, the total number of organizations where volunteering took place would equal the number of individuals. However, if everyone had volunteered with approximately two organizations, then volunteering would have occurred at $177 \times 2 = 354$ organizations. Therefore, the organizational reach of volunteering, participation in meetings, membership, and non-membership donations across the country depends not only on the overall rate of engagement but also on how many different organizations individuals engage with for each type of activity.

Figures 7.7a through 7.7d illustrate the number of different organizations in which respondents reported engaging in volunteering, attending meetings, holding memberships, and making

donations other than membership fees. The data indicates that, over time, there has been little change in the proportion of individuals who report engaging in the same activity in two or more different organizations—except in the case of non-membership donations. For membership, participation in meetings, and volunteering, most individuals engage with only one organization. However, in the case of non-membership donations, while individuals often make regular contributions to a single organization, the 2024 survey shows a notable rise in the proportion of those reporting donations to two or even three different organizations.

This represents a significant new dynamic: while 14.1% reported donating to a single organization, 12.4% gave to two, and 5.2% to three different organizations. Those who reported donating to four or more organizations accounted for 2.9%. In other words, the majority of those who reported making donations contributed to more than one organization. This undoubtedly allows them to compare organizations with one another. Donors will thus be able to make future giving decisions not solely based on their experience with a single organization, but by assessing how different organizations have used their donations and




FIGURE 7.7a

Total number of
organizations
volunteered at

FIGURE 7.7b

Total number of organizations where respondents attend meetings




FIGURE 7.7c

Total number of organizations respondents are a member of





FIGURE 7.7d

Total number of
organizations
donated to



what kind of impact they have achieved. In other words, CSOs that receive donations in this field will now be competing with one another based on performance.


In the preceding sections, we provided estimates of the approximate per capita amounts donated for religiously motivated giving, as well as direct support extended to relatives, neighbors, other people in need, and money given to beggars. Figure 7.8 below presents the per capita amounts of all donations made both directly and through organizations. All figures are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2024 prices. Donations made to organizations reached their highest average per capita value to date in 2024, amounting to 1,277 TL. In other words, donations made through organizations—approximately 160 TL per capita in 2004, adjusted to 2024 prices—have increased nearly seven and a half times. Even at this level, these donations remain below the combined per capita value of fitrah and zakat, which stands at approximately 1,763 TL. However, while fitrah increased by approximately 49% and zakat by 167%, the fact that donations made through organizations rose by a factor of 7.5 is particularly

noteworthy. In contrast, donations given to individuals engaged in street begging have remained virtually unchanged in real terms.

There has also been a notable rise in the per capita average of direct donations made to people in need—such as relatives, neighbors, and others. However, these increases remain modest compared to the rise in donations made through organizations or motivated by religious reasons. For example, over the past twenty years, donations to neighbors have increased by 118%, to relatives by 37%, and to other people in need by 328%. In summary, donations made through formal organizations have shown the highest rate of increase compared to informal giving over the past two decades. The rate of increase in religiously motivated fitrah and zakat has been lower than the rise in the donations made to people in need other than relatives and neighbors. However, setting aside growth rates and focusing on the absolute per capita amounts, fitrah and zakat together constitute the largest category of giving. This is followed by donations through organizations. Direct donations to people in need, other than relatives and neighbors, ranked third in 2024..

FIGURE 7.8

Estimated per capita financial value of direct giving made over the past year (TL)



The total amount of aid and donations estimated in our study corresponds to 0.98% of Türkiye's GDP for the period under focus.¹² In the previous reports, this ratio was estimated at 0.95% in 2021, 0.5% in 2019, and 0.8% in 2015. Therefore, the share of aid and donations in Türkiye's overall economy appears to have increased slightly in 2024 compared to the recent past. Considering that GDP reflects all economic activity, the donation figures reported to us—both formal and informal—indicate that individual giving has approached approximately 1% of GDP. This ratio stands at 1.44% in the United States, 0.79% in New Zealand, and 0.77% in Canada, where informal in-kind or monetary donations are not as widespread as in Türkiye.¹³

IN-DEPTH STATISTICAL ANALYSES

Earlier, we discussed various factors that we expected to influence philanthropic and giving behavior and stated that we would test these using empirical data. This section presents the results of these tests, based on a set of simple logistic regression models. Logistic regression is used when the dependent variable we aim to explain takes only two possible values, such as yes or no. If one of these responses is defined as the desired outcome (1) and the other as (0), logistic regression analysis allows us to test whether each variable has a statistically significant effect on increasing or decreasing the probability of this outcome—and to estimate the strength of that

effect. Table 7.1 presents the results of logistic regression estimations, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator coded as (1) for respondents who reported engaging in donation and volunteering, as well as membership and participation in CSO meetings, and (0) for those who did not engage in these activities. The dependent variables here correspond to those presented in Figure 7.1.

The results indicate that some of our expectations hold true even within a multivariate model framework that controls for various factors. In these multivariate models, we do not observe any significant differences between women and men. While age does not appear to influence the likelihood of making a donation, it has a positive effect on all other forms of engagement. The likelihood of attending meetings, volunteering, and becoming a member increases with age. Higher levels of education do not appear to affect the likelihood of donating, becoming a member, or attending meetings, but they are associated with an increased likelihood of volunteering. Individuals who speak Kurdish have a higher probability of volunteering and becoming members compared to those who do not. Similarly, Alevi respondents are significantly more likely to donate, become members, and attend CSO meetings.

As individuals' self-reported level of religiosity increases, their likelihood of making donations also rises; however, it does not appear to influence their likelihood of becoming a member, volunteering, or attending CSO meetings. The frequency of worship, on the other hand, has no observable effect on the likelihood of membership, donation, volunteering, or meeting participation. While per capita household income does not create a significant difference, the likelihood of donating, becoming a member, volunteering, and attending meetings increases as the household's asset ownership or wealth level rises. Marital status or being married appears to only reduce the likelihood of becoming a member.

12 This ratio was calculated using the Turkish Statistical Institute's third-quarter GDP figures: <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Donemsel-Gayrisafi-%20Yurt-Ici-Hasila-III.-Ceyrek-Temmuz-Eylul,-2024-53755> Assuming a 2.5% GDP growth rate in the fourth quarter, we calculated the share of the per capita formal and informal donation amounts identified in this study—based on the voting-age population—in Türkiye's total GDP for 2024.

13 See the 2016 Charities Aid Foundation report: <https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-policy-and-campaigns/gross-domestic-philanthropy-feb-2016.pdf>

TABLE 7.1

Determinants of the likelihood of donating through organizations, membership, volunteering, and participation in CSO meetings

	Those who donate				Those who become a member				Those who volunteer				Those who participate in meetings			
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)		B	S.E.	Exp(B)		B	S.E.	Exp(B)		B	S.E.	Exp(B)	
Women	0.09	0.15	1.09		-0.30	0.22	0.74		-0.21	0.22	0.81		-0.06	0.24	0.94	
Age	0.01	0.01	1.01		0.04	0.01	1.04	***	0.03	0.01	1.03	***	0.02	0.01	1.02	***
Years of education	0.03	0.02	1.03		0.01	0.03	1.01		0.08	0.03	1.08	***	0.02	0.03	1.02	
Speaks Kurdish	-0.47	0.24	0.62	**	1.35	0.28	3.88	***	1.39	0.27	4.02	***	0.16	0.35	1.17	
Alevi	1.01	0.18	2.75	***	0.53	0.24	1.70	**	-0.03	0.26	0.97		0.46	0.27	1.59	*
Frequency of worship	-0.02	0.05	0.98		0.02	0.07	1.02		0.05	0.07	1.05		0.10	0.08	1.11	
Religiosity level (0–10)	0.21	0.05	1.23	***	-0.03	0.07	0.97		-0.07	0.07	0.94		-0.10	0.08	0.90	
Asset ownership (0–100)	0.04	0.01	1.04	***	0.06	0.01	1.06	***	0.05	0.01	1.05	***	0.05	0.01	1.05	***
Per capita household income TL	0.00	0.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	1.00	
Married	0.22	0.19	1.25		-0.88	0.26	0.41	***	-0.22	0.26	0.80		-0.20	0.29	0.82	
Trust in CSOs (0–1)	1.39	0.57	4.02	**	-0.55	0.80	0.58		0.19	0.82	1.21		0.38	0.91	1.46	
Trust in central government institutions (0–1)	-0.43	0.52	0.65		0.57	0.76	1.76		0.63	0.76	1.88		0.41	0.81	1.50	
Trust in the GNAT (0–1)	-0.90	0.39	0.41	**	-0.41	0.57	0.67		-0.02	0.56	0.98		-0.76	0.59	0.47	
Trust in other public institutions (0–1)	-1.07	0.48	0.34	**	-0.12	0.68	0.89		0.43	0.66	1.53		0.06	0.73	1.06	
Life satisfaction (0–10)	0.25	0.07	1.28	***	0.07	0.10	1.07		-0.08	0.10	0.92		-0.11	0.11	0.90	
Retrospective assessment of economic situation	0.05	0.05	1.05		0.23	0.07	1.26	***	0.04	0.07	1.04		-0.09	0.08	0.91	
Assessment of current economic situation	0.10	0.05	1.10	**	-0.07	0.07	0.93		0.13	0.06	1.14	**	0.12	0.07	1.13	*
Prospective assessment of economic situation	0.05	0.05	1.05		-0.03	0.07	0.97		-0.05	0.07	0.96		0.09	0.08	1.10	
Constant	-5.97	0.67	0.00	***	-7.31	0.94	0.00	***	-7.61	0.93	0.00	***	-6.76	1.01	0.00	***
Nagelkerke R-squared	0.26				0.20				0.21				0.13			

* <0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01

Trust in organizations affects only the likelihood of donating. As trust in CSOs increases, so does the likelihood of making a donation. As expected, life satisfaction and positive current economic assessments also increase the likelihood of donating. As assessments of the current economic situation improve, their likelihood of participating in meetings and volunteering also increases. As retrospective assessments of the economic situation improve, only the likelihood of becoming a member increases.

We also included agreement questions on ten separate statements regarding perceptions of philanthropy. Rather than analyzing how each of these statements was perceived individually, we utilized the high degree of intercorrelation among them to apply a latent variable approach, aiming to identify the underlying dimensions these statements may collectively reflect. The results of the factor analysis conducted for this purpose are presented in Table 7.2. When we interpret the clustering

Dimensions of philanthropy

TABLE 7.2

	Dimensions			
	Consistent civil society donors and volunteers	Conservative and globally oriented donors	Major religious giving	Divergence between support for artistic activities and small-scale sadaqah
Making regular monthly donations to a foundation or association	0.83	0.11	0.19	0.01
Donating a portion of one's personal wealth to civil society organizations	0.83	0.12	0.13	0.02
Volunteering at civil society organizations	0.81	0.21	0.11	0.09
Engaging in volunteer activities at different organizations	0.66	0.45	-0.02	-0.10
Sponsoring students, providing scholarships, funding the construction of schools and dormitories	0.25	0.78	-0.08	0.01
Helping people in need anywhere in the world, regardless of their religion or nationality	0.06	0.75	0.28	0.28
Giving zakat annually, proportionate to one's financial means	0.37	0.49	0.13	-0.29
Funding the construction of a mosque	0.19	0.06	0.93	0.04
Supporting cultural and artistic activities such as museums, exhibitions, concerts, and festivals	0.15	0.16	0.09	0.83
Giving sadaqah to those in need	0.29	0.37	0.40	-0.50
% of Variance	28.16	18.56	11.94	11.27

Principal Component Analysis. Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation Method: Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

patterns of the statements under each dimension to infer their underlying meaning, we observe that the first dimension is characterized by themes associated with “consistent civil society donors and volunteers.” Those who agree with statements related to regular giving and volunteering receive high scores on this first dimension. The second dimension appears to reflect a philanthropic perspective that may be characterized as “conservative and globally oriented donors.” Respondents who score high on this dimension tend to agree with statements such as paying one’s zakat, helping people in need anywhere in the world regardless of their religion or nationality, and

supporting education through scholarships or constructing schools and dormitories. In the third dimension, individuals who consider building a mosque as a primary form of philanthropy have a dominant influence. The fourth dimension, on the other hand, reflects a perspective that emphasizes support for artistic activities as a philanthropic act, while distancing itself from associating sadaqah with philanthropy.

Table 7.3 presents a simple series of regression models aimed at identifying the characteristics of participants who support each of these four dimensions. There appears to be no significant

TABLE 7.3

What factors explain the dimensions of philanthropy?

	Consistent civil society donors and volunteers			Conservative and globally oriented donors			Major religious giving			Divergence between support for artistic activities and small-scale sadaqah		
	B	Std. Error		B	Std. Error		B	Std. Error		B	Std. Error	
Constant	-1.17	0.22	***	-0.67	0.22	***	-0.79	0.20	***	0.38	0.22	*
Female Gender = 1	-0.06	0.06		0.00	0.06		0.07	0.06		0.06	0.06	
Age	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	*	0.00	0.00		-0.01	0.00	***
Years of education	0.01	0.01		0.02	0.01	*	0.00	0.01		0.00	0.01	
Speaks Kurdish	-0.11	0.09		0.35	0.09	***	0.31	0.08	***	0.00	0.09	
Alevi	-0.08	0.07		-0.21	0.07	***	-0.17	0.07	**	0.27	0.07	***
Frequency of worship	-0.06	0.02	***	0.01	0.02		0.10	0.02	***	0.00	0.02	
Religiosity	0.10	0.02	***	0.02	0.02		0.09	0.02	***	-0.05	0.02	**
Asset ownership index	0.01	0.00	***	0.01	0.00	**	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Per capita household income	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Married	0.00	0.07		-0.15	0.07	**	0.03	0.07		0.12	0.08	
Adjusted R Square	0.06			0.03			0.15			0.03		

* <0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01

TABLE 7.4

Trust in CSOs

gender-based difference in how the four distinct dimensions of philanthropy are perceived. As age increases, the tendency to consider support for cultural activities as a form of philanthropy decreases. In this dimension, Alevi participants tend to agree with the idea that supporting cultural activities constitutes philanthropy. In contrast, those who identify as increasingly religious are less inclined to share this view. Those scoring high on the fourth dimension—which highlights artistic activities in the definition of philanthropy—tend to belong to a comparatively younger age group.

Kurdish speakers score higher on the “conservative and globally oriented” dimension, while Alevi participants score lower on average. As self-perceived religiosity and frequency of worship increases, so does the tendency to agree with the statements grouped under the first and third dimensions. However, the tendency to agree with “conservative and globally oriented” statements remain unchanged. While per capita household income has no significant effect across any of the dimensions, increased asset ownership is associated with a higher likelihood of agreement with statements in the first and second dimensions.

The study also included a series of assessments regarding how CSOs operate, what they can and cannot do, and the relationships between individuals and CSOs. As with the philanthropic perception statements analyzed earlier, these assessments also exhibit a high degree of intercorrelation. This time, however, we do not observe a multidimensional pattern of assessment. Table 7.4 shows that evaluations reflecting both trust in CSOs and the expectations of individuals’ social circles regarding their relationships with CSOs are strongly interrelated. In other words, individuals who tend to believe that CSOs operate transparently and effectively also tend to be surrounded by a social circle that supports donating—and to consider themselves likely to donate in the future.

	Trust in CSOs dimension
Most people who are important to me think I should make charitable donations	0.81
Helping others by donating to civil society organizations is important	0.78
Civil society organizations are capable of solving the problems they encounter	0.78
Civil society organizations inform donors about how their contributions are used	0.78
Civil society organizations use donated funds appropriately	0.78
Civil society organizations are transparent/ accountable	0.78
Civil society organizations understand the needs of recipients	0.77
I am very likely to make charitable donations in the near future	0.77
% of Variance	61.31

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 7.5 presents the estimation results of a regression model in which the dependent variable is the factor scores summarizing trust in CSOs. What stands out here is that, once again, gender differences are not statistically significant, whereas individuals with higher levels of education tend to give more positive evaluations of CSOs and report a higher likelihood of donating. Religiosity and asset ownership also show a significant and positive effect. However, frequency of worship does not appear to have a statistically significant impact.

TABLE 7.5

Determinants of trust in CSOs and outcomes

	B	Std. Error	
Constant	-1.70	0.21	***
Female Gender = 1	0.04	0.06	
Age	0.00	0.00	
Years of education	0.03	0.01	***
Speaks Kurdish	0.25	0.09	***
Alevi	0.10	0.07	
Frequency of worship	-0.03	0.02	*
Religiosity	0.10	0.02	***
Asset ownership index	0.02	0.00	***
Per capita household income	0.00	0.00	
Married	0.15	0.07	**
Adjusted R Square	0.13		

* <0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01

8. DISASTER GIVING

Following major disasters such as the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, the increased visibility and activity of civil society is a pattern frequently observed around the world. Similarly, after the 7.4-magnitude Marmara Earthquake that occurred on August 17, 1999, civil society stood out with its rapid coordination and effective response efforts. These efforts prominently included search and rescue operations, providing shelter and basic needs for individuals affected by the earthquake, and the delivery of donations collected from the public to those in need.

Many experts and academic studies note that the inadequacy of the state's response following the Marmara Earthquake created both physical and political space for civil society organizations, while also significantly increasing their public credibility.¹⁴ Some even consider the Marmara Earthquake one of the most critical turning points in the development of civil society in Türkiye comparable to the country's

European Union accession process in terms of its impact.

Following the two major earthquakes of magnitudes 7.8 and 7.5 that struck on 6 February 2023, approximately 60,000 people lost their lives and hundreds of thousands were left homeless in Türkiye and Syria, according to official figures. Similar to the Marmara Earthquake, civil society once again played a prominent role in the aftermath of this major disaster both in addressing basic needs and in undertaking specialized efforts in areas such as healthcare, children's rights, and the rights of migrants. In addition, many individuals from Türkiye and abroad quickly mobilized to engage in volunteer work and made both monetary and in-kind donations. To encourage individual giving, numerous civil society organizations, private sector actors, and public institutions organized aid campaigns.

In this section of our study, we examine disaster giving in general, as well as giving and volunteering following the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes. As the first systematic survey on disaster giving conducted in Türkiye, this module does not allow for comparisons with previous data.

¹⁴ Jalali, R. (2002). Civil society and the state: Turkey after the earthquake. *Disasters*, 26(2), 120-139.

Participants were first asked a series of questions about their behavior following major disasters. Figure 8.1 presents information on the types of organizations citizens prefer to donate to in the aftermath of a disaster. According to the survey results, the highest proportion of respondents (25%) preferred to reach those in need directly and without intermediaries. This was followed by civil society organizations at 24% and public institutions at 23%. It is noteworthy that civil society organizations, albeit by a small margin, rank ahead of public institutions.

Local municipalities were the fourth most preferred channel, selected by 11% of

respondents, followed by neighbourhood-level organizations at 7% and mosque associations at 4%. Participation in campaigns organized in schools and workplaces remained limited at 1%; however, this low rate should be interpreted in the context of the sample structure. In a nationally representative sample of Türkiye, individuals formally employed in blue- or white-collar positions account for 34.8% of the sample, while students make up only 5.4%. Therefore, the opportunity to make donations through a formal workplace or school organization is only relevant for a limited segment of the population.

FIGURE 8.1

In the event of a major disaster such as a large-scale earthquake, wildfire, or flood, through which organizations would you primarily consider making a donation? (%)




FIGURE 8.2

In the event of a major disaster such as a large-scale earthquake, wildfire, or flood, how would you primarily prefer to support those affected? (%)




Figure 8.2 presents individuals’ preferences for making donations following a disaster. The primary choice among respondents was monetary donations, reported by 51%. In-kind donations followed at 36%. Only 8% of respondents chose to contribute through volunteering despite its critical importance in the aftermath of disasters. The proportion of individuals who chose to donate via cryptocurrencies (digital assets that have gained popularity in recent years and developed distinct communities beyond their function as investment instruments) remained notably low, at 0.5%.

According to research on social networks, individuals rarely make decisions in isolation.¹⁵ Family, close friends, online platforms, and other face-to-face relationships can significantly shape critical behaviors such as providing aid after a disaster. Figure 8.3 shows the extent to which individuals engage with their social networks on matters related to disasters.

Close family and relatives stand out as the social networks where disaster-related issues are most frequently discussed (72%) and where joint disaster donations are most often made (29%). Colleagues, classmates, and neighbours—people encountered in daily life—are the networks with whom 56% of individuals share disaster-related topics and 19% make joint disaster donations.

While 42% of respondents followed disaster-related developments on social media platforms, only 15% reported making joint donations through groups on these platforms. Finally, 30% of respondents reported following disaster-related discussions through private messaging groups such as WhatsApp, while 13% stated that they participated in donation campaigns via these groups.

These findings clearly highlight the critical role of informal networks in mobilizing individuals in the aftermath of disasters. Policymakers and civil society organizations working in post-disaster contexts should develop strategies to leverage these informal networks, recognizing their influence on individuals’ collective decision-making and donation behaviors.

¹⁵ Diani, M. (2011). Social movements and collective action. The SAGE handbook of social network analysis, 223-235.

FIGURE 8.3

I will now read you a series of statements about your experiences following major disasters such as a severe earthquake, wildfire, or flood. Please indicate how frequently you engage in each of the following activities. (%)



FIGURE 8.4

Did you provide support to those living in the region after the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes? (%)




FIGURE 8.5

How did you provide support following the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes? (%)



An analysis of donation and volunteering behavior in response to the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes reveals that 65% of citizens participated in some form of post-disaster relief effort (Figure 8.4). Monetary and in-kind donations emerged as the most common forms of support, reported by 47% and 46% of respondents, respectively. Coordinating in-kind aid such as food and supplies immediately after the earthquake and delivering it effectively to those in need is an especially challenging process. The media frequently reported that in-kind donations, often collected informally in small groups and sent to the earthquake-affected region via personally organized trucks, were widely mobilized but

some of these supplies failed to reach those in need. The high prevalence of in-kind donations raises important questions about how such aid can be managed more effectively. Although those who donated via cryptocurrency constitute only 1% of the total, this method stands out as a form of giving not observed in previous disasters. The rate of participation in post-earthquake volunteering activities is 7%.

FIGURE 8.6

What was your primary reason for not making a donation after the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes? (Among the 33% who did not donate) (%)




Figure 8.6 outlines the reasons why some individuals did not make donations following the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes. The most cited reason for not donating was the inability to allocate a budget, reported by a striking 61% of respondents. This high percentage may reflect the indirect impact of the economic crisis Türkiye has been experiencing since the winter of 2021.

Other reasons for not giving are the belief—shared by 9% of participants—that state efforts were sufficient. 8% of respondents stated that they did not donate because they were unable to track the impact of the donations. 6% indicated that no individual or organization had directly asked them to donate. 3% said they lacked information about which organizations they could donate to. 2% reported being committed to other charitable causes, while another 2% stated that they were unaware of the severity of the earthquake. Lastly, 2% of respondents stated that their reason for not donating was something other than the listed options.

FIGURE 8.7

Through which organizations did you donate after the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes? (%)




Figure 8.7, which reflects people's organizational preferences in the aftermath of the earthquake, is particularly striking. Civil society organizations emerged as the top choice of 25% of participants, surpassing both direct giving and public organizations. Those who opted to make direct, unmediated donations to people in need account for 19%. This relatively high figure may raise questions regarding the level of trust in both civil society and public organizations.

Local municipalities were chosen by 19% of respondents, a figure closely aligned with the 17% who preferred public institutions. Informal mobilizations through local networks and mosque associations were selected by 12% and 3% of participants, respectively. The share of those who participated in donation campaigns organized at workplaces stands at 3%, while participation in school-based campaigns is approximately 2%.

FIGURE 8.8

What were your main sources of information regarding developments after the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes? (%)




FIGURE 8.9

Considering all the donations you made after the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, what is the estimated total amount of your contributions? (%)




FIGURE 8.10

Have you continued
your donations
regularly after the
Kahramanmaraş
earthquakes? (%)




Figure 8.8 presents the breakdown of the primary sources respondents used to stay informed about developments related to the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes. TV news channels emerged as the most frequently used medium for following the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, cited as the primary source of information by 61% of respondents. Online or print newspapers were the first choice for 21%, while a total of 17% reported turning to social media networks, most commonly X (Twitter) (9%), followed by Instagram (1%) and Facebook (1%). WhatsApp groups and TikTok were selected as the primary sources by less than 1% of respondents.

Figure 8.9 presents the distribution of individual donations made in the aftermath of the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes. Donations of 1,000 TL or less account for 21%, while those between 1,001 and 2,000 TL represent 14%. Donations ranging from 2,001 to 3,000 TL stand at 7%, 3,001 to 4,000 TL at 2%, and contributions between 4,001 and 5,000 TL and over 5,000 TL are reported at 4% and 7%, respectively.

As previously illustrated, the aftermath of the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes may well mark the most intense period of individual giving in Türkiye's history. In this context, one of the key questions for philanthropy in Türkiye is whether the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes have led to a long-term shift in individual giving behavior. As shown in Figure 8.10, 13% of those who made donations in the aftermath of the earthquake report that they have continued to give on a regular basis. While this percentage may not seem particularly high, if sustained over time, it could indicate that the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes had a meaningful impact on philanthropic behavior in Türkiye.

FIGURE 8.11

**How do you
continue your
regular donations?
(distribution within
the 13%)**





FIGURE 8.12

**If given the
opportunity, how
would you prefer to
continue your
donations regularly?
(%)**



When we examine how this 13% who continue to donate regularly have maintained their giving (Figure 8.11), we see that the majority of them prefer to donate directly, without intermediaries. Among those who continued their donations, 31% sent in-kind aid via postal service, 29% handed over cash in person, 23% wired money via bank, and 15% maintained their donations through automatic credit card payments.

A similar pattern emerged when those who had discontinued their donations were asked how they would have preferred to resume giving (Figure 8.12). While 35% would choose to send in-kind aid via postal service, 28% would prefer bank transfers. 18% would opt to continue by handing over cash in person, and only 9% would choose automatic credit card payments. An additional 10% did not state a preference. One possible inference here is that those who did not donate appear unlikely to have opted for a formal channel even if they had chosen to give.

To summarize the key findings of this section, in which we examined disaster giving and patterns of donation and volunteering following the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes: Citizens appear to prefer informal giving over donating through organizations. However, such practices inevitably pose various challenges to the effective and efficient distribution of disaster aid.

Among individuals who preferred to donate through organizations, civil society organizations were favored over public organizations. This may represent a critical turning point similar to the aftermath of the Marmara Earthquake in terms of enhancing the resources, effectiveness, and public standing of civil society. However, it should be noted that in the aftermath of large-scale and devastating disasters such as the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, public institutions remain the actors with the highest capacity for effective intervention. The shift in public support from public organizations toward civil society may ultimately weaken the effectiveness of those

institutions in disaster response. This, in turn, could be considered an undesirable outcome.

Following the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, we observe that a significant share of the society engaged in philanthropic activities through formal or informal channels. However, only a limited share of this group appears to have sustained these activities over time. In a country like Türkiye, where regular philanthropic engagement remains low, even the continued commitment of this small group may represent an important step toward the development of a stronger culture of philanthropy.

In addition, we presented findings suggesting that informal networks may influence post-disaster behaviors. These networks could be taken into consideration when developing strategies for post-disaster mobilization efforts.

9. CONCLUSION

This study, conducted since 2004 with the initiative and support of TÜSEV, not only examines the evolution of philanthropic and giving behaviors in Türkiye over the years but also reflects broader changes in the country's social structure. Basic demographic data indicates rising education levels, an aging population, smaller households, and a significant shift toward an increasingly urbanized society. These developments are undoubtedly unsurprising. However, even a broadly familiar modernization process comes with its own specific ups and downs and bottlenecks. At its core, it is reasonable to expect that households experiencing rising incomes and growing assets would lead more stable and fulfilling lives. Yet from 2004 to 2024, despite increases in wealth and per capita income, levels of economic satisfaction have declined, as has overall life satisfaction.

Over the past two decades, these shifts in the broader economic environment appear to have had a direct impact on individual giving. Although objective household income has risen, difficulties in meeting expectations, coupled with uncertainty and negative perceptions of the economic situation, seem to have discouraged individuals from donating. Nonetheless, the sense of urgency created by disasters appears to have had a counter effect, prompting large segments of the public to mobilize in striking displays of generosity in the aftermath of such events. The last two rounds of our study, in 2021 and 2024, reflect these waves of mobilization. Although the overall number of individuals making donations based on general religious or worldly motivations appears to be declining (possibly reflecting the unequal nature of income distribution across the country) a smaller group of donors is observed to be contributing increasingly larger amounts.

When examining levels of trust in institutions in 2024, relatively low rates stand out compared to previous years. Although there are many factors that shape individual giving, the persistently low level of trust in institutions can be considered a major obstacle to the institutionalization of philanthropy in Türkiye. Low levels of trust in both public institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) hinder the full utilization of available financial and human resources in times of urgent need. Although it is legally registered as an association, Turkish Red Crescent—owing to its historical proximity to state institutions—holds a distinct status and has made notable progress in both donation and volunteering. This finding is observed despite widespread negative public perception and media debates. In disaster-related mobilization efforts, public institutions must work in coordination and harmony with CSOs rather than in competition with them. In this regard, it is critically important for both CSOs and public institutions to build and maintain public trust.

When we examine ideological shifts over the years, we observe a decline in centrist voters and an increase in those who identify with the center-right and center-left. This trend points to a growing political polarization in Türkiye. This growing polarization may well constitute one of the underlying factors contributing to the erosion of trust in disaster-related donation efforts carried out by CSOs and public organizations. Opposition voters may be hesitant to make disaster-related donations through public institutions, especially when they do not feel aligned with the government or have low levels of trust in those institutions. However, our study does not provide findings that support this expectation. The main reason is that among the approximately 12% who reported making non-membership donations to Turkish Red Crescent, no significant differentiation is observed in terms of party preferences. Nonetheless, it is essential to recognize that when trust assumes a more explicitly partisan character, it may incur broader societal costs.

Although the proportion of individuals making fitrah and zakat payments and performing

animal sacrifices has declined since 2004, it is noteworthy that a small group now makes significantly larger religious donations compared to the past. In such forms of giving, direct donations take precedence over formal channels, with contributions typically directed toward close circles such as relatives, friends, or acquaintances. These types of informal donations, by their nature, are less likely to effectively address broader societal needs. It is only natural that individual efforts fall short when it comes to both reaching those in genuine need and ensuring the most effective use of resources. When informal, direct giving—whether motivated by religious or more worldly reasons—is considered as a whole, it becomes evident that the majority of donations and charitable acts in Türkiye remain informal. This informality, despite the overall increase in the volume of donations and aid, may be seen as an obstacle to achieving a corresponding rise in the effective use of these resources.

When we examine the role of organizations in giving, we see that the proportion of individuals donating through organizations has nearly doubled between 2004 and 2024. It is important to note that this increase has primarily been driven by disaster-related giving. Similarly, rates of volunteering, participation in meetings, and membership in CSOs have also risen. These findings stand out as positive indicators of the development of civil society in Türkiye. A closer examination of specific organizations reveals a significant increase in the share of individuals donating to organizations such as LÖSEV and the Ahbap Association, alongside the Turkish Red Crescent. In other words, despite various constraints, there are notable success stories within Türkiye's philanthropy and giving landscape. A rough calculation shows that the total amount of informal and formal donations corresponds to approximately 0.98% of the GDP, marking a slight increase compared to the previous 2021 study. That said, although donation figures show meaningful increases in themselves, they still lag behind the country's GDP growth, resulting in only a limited proportional increase.

It is clear that the most significant barrier to realizing the existing potential is the lack of trust in organizations. The adherence of organizations to principles of transparency, accountability, and fairness is far more important than factors such as their area of work, the qualifications of their management team, whether they operate locally or nationwide, the duration of their projects, or the methods through which they collect donations. Organizations, whether public or civil society, that are not trusted by the public lead individuals to rely on informal giving instead. This, in turn, limits the social impact of philanthropy.

It is evident that we still have much to learn about how the public perceives the principles of transparency, accountability, and fairness. In our study, it is challenging to assert that CSOs that appear to have a strong capacity to collect donations are fully transparent or accountable. Likewise, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that they consistently uphold the principle of fairness in their work. However, by maintaining high visibility or effectively communicating their activities, it is certainly possible for organizations to enhance both their credibility and capacity to collect donations. How this capacity is to be formed and sustained is a question that should be explored in future studies. Similarly, the fact that organizations operating at the national level appear to have a greater capacity to collect donations than those working locally is not fully understood. Why do individuals tend to donate to organizations conducting activities at the national level rather than to those operating closer to them at the local level? We are unable to provide an answer to this question at this stage and leave it for future research to address.

When it comes to the propensity to donate, personal wealth appears to be more significant than income, and how religious individuals perceive themselves seems more relevant than the frequency of worship. Subjective assessments of economic well-being appear to be more influential than objective indicators. The importance of wealth as an accumulated asset yields an unexpected outcome: short-term economic crises appear to have a less significant impact on giving behavior than anticipated. This,

in turn, offers a degree of protection for the field of philanthropy against short-term fluctuations. The ultimate effect is primarily shaped by individuals' subjective assessments of their economic situation. Based on this finding, even if people's real incomes increase, the tendency to refrain from donating will likely persist as long as the perception that their situation has not improved remains dominant.

Similarly, the decline in religious practices in daily life does not appear to impact donation behaviors driven by religious motives, indicating the persistence of a momentum that sustains continuity. Individuals who are unable to attend mosque or perform prayers as frequently as expected, yet still consider themselves strongly religious, do not exhibit any decline in giving behaviors motivated by religious reasons. This suggests that, even as people adopt more worldly practices in the course of modernization, spiritual motivations continue to hold significance—at least in terms of giving behavior.

When we examine giving and volunteering behavior following the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, we observe that individuals who preferred to deliver their aid to those in need through CSOs ranked first. This is, of course, an encouraging finding for civil society in Türkiye. Following the devastating earthquakes, a large segment of the population participated in relief efforts, and a small but notable portion of these participants have continued their involvement regularly. The presence of a group that has continued to donate regularly after the disaster stands out as an important step in the development of a culture of philanthropy in Türkiye.

However, the increase in both formal and informal donations is primarily the result of the momentum generated by the series of devastating disasters that have occurred in recent years. The lack of sustained and long-term donations lies at the heart of the problem. In a country with a clearly evident philanthropic potential, the main challenge is to channel this potential into a structured, institutionalized, and permanent form. Achieving this goal requires long-term, trust-building collaboration between public institutions and civil society organizations.





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